Washington Law Review
Volume 87

Number 4

12-1-2012

Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics, and
Human Rights
Rebecca Tsosie

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics, and Human Rights, 87
Wash. L. Rev. 1133 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol87/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

12/7/2012 7:38 PM

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE:
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Rebecca Tsosie
Abstract: This Article explores the use of science as a tool of public policy and examines
how science policy impacts indigenous peoples in the areas of environmental protection,
public health, and repatriation. Professor Tsosie draws on Miranda Fricker’s account of
“epistemic injustice” to show how indigenous peoples have been harmed by the domestic
legal system and the policies that guide the implementation of the law in those three arenas.
Professor Tsosie argues that the theme of “discovery,” which is pivotal to scientific inquiry,
has governed the violation of indigenous peoples’ human rights since the colonial era. Today,
science policy is overtly “neutral,” but it may still be utilized to the disadvantage of
indigenous peoples. Drawing on international human rights law, Professor Tsosie
demonstrates how public policy could shift from treating indigenous peoples as “objects” of
scientific discovery to working respectfully with indigenous governments as equal
participants in the creation of public policy. By incorporating human rights standards and
honoring indigenous self-determination, domestic public policy can more equitably respond
to indigenous peoples’ distinctive experience. Similarly, scientists and scientific
organizations can incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods and
professional codes of ethics as they respond to the ethical and legal implications of their
work.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientists and scientific organizations are increasingly challenged to
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incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods and
professional codes of ethics and to explore the impact of their work on
indigenous peoples. In particular, indigenous knowledge and benefitsharing are vital considerations for contemporary biomedical
researchers.1 These concepts are also relevant to adaptation planning in
an era of climate change.2 In many ways, these fields of research are at
the cutting edge of scientific inquiry relative to human health and the
environment, and they will continue to be of vital importance to our
collective future. In the United States, public policy often promotes
certain forms of scientific research, for example, by providing grant
initiatives from government entities such as the National Institutes of
Health or Department of Energy. However, this research often
implicates many legal and ethical controversies, indicating that there is
still a great deal of work to be done at the intersection of scientific ethics
and human rights.
This Article discusses the use of science as a tool of public policy
and examines how science policy impacts indigenous peoples. More
specifically, this Article focuses on three areas of public policy in which
science has disregarded indigenous human rights: environmental
protection, public health, and the repatriation of ancestral human
remains. Ignoring indigenous rights in setting policy over these three
areas impairs tribal interests in protecting their land, identity, and
cultural heritage. These interests are all key components of the right to
self-determination recognized by the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples,3 which provides important standards to improve
domestic public policy. Today, federally-recognized Native Nations
within the United States operate as separate sovereign governments.4
They exercise jurisdiction over their members, as well as their territory,
including nonmembers who enter tribal lands or enter transactions with
the tribe or its members.5 Although contemporary tribal governments
have a growing presence in the domestic political arena, prevailing
1. See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic
Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 396 (2007) (discussing
biomedical research).
2. See Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the Future of
Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 188 (2009)
(discussing energy development and adaptation planning).
3. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].
4. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322–23 (1978).
5. Id. at 564–66.
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federal policies governing environmental protection, public health, and
the repatriation of ancestral human remains, continue to impact them
heavily. Historically, the federal government did not consider the
interests of the tribal governments in shaping domestic policy in these
three areas. Consequently, the application of these policies has often
harmed Native peoples.6
Unfortunately, standard legal theories cannot redress many of these
harms because the existing frameworks of property, torts, and contract
law often fail to adequately account for the indigenous peoples’
interests. Of course, that does not mean that the harm did not exist.
Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s account of “epistemic injustice,” this
Article argues that indigenous peoples have been harmed by the
domestic legal system in their capacity as “giver[s] of knowledge” and
in their capacity as “subject[s] of social understanding.”7 In particular,
the theme of “discovery,” which is pivotal to scientific inquiry, has
governed the violation of indigenous peoples’ human rights since the
colonial era.
This Article takes the position that science policy can promote
effective partnerships and facilitate the realization of human rights if
guided by appropriate ethical constructs. Too often, public policy
discourse portrays the interests of scientists as being opposed to those of
indigenous peoples. This is a false dichotomy. Scientific knowledge can
be used for broad public benefit, thereby serving indigenous peoples as
well as others. All this requires is that the relevant harms are identified
and addressed. International human rights law presents an array of
principles that can structure a more positive collaboration between
scientists and Native peoples on issues of mutual concern, thereby
leading to positive changes in domestic law and policy.
Part I of this Article will discuss the history of science policy as it has
impacted indigenous peoples. Part II of the Article draws upon Miranda
Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice to illustrate the nature of
indigenous peoples’ claims and the harms that have arisen through the
legal system’s inability to recognize these claims. In Part III, the Article
discusses three areas of policy development that have created conflicts
between indigenous peoples and scientists. Finally, Part IV discusses
several principles of international human rights law relevant to future
policy development in these three areas and suggests how existing
scientific and legal frameworks can be transformed to better reflect

6. See infra Part III.
7. MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 7 (2007).
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contemporary human rights norms.
I.

NATIVE NATIONS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
“DISCOVERY”: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND NINETEENTH
CENTURY SCIENCE

Commentators often mischaracterize the interests of Native
Americans as being in opposition to those of scientists.8 It is more
productive to examine how science policy reflects certain principles of
thought and a particular research methodology. This methodology may
be used for beneficial or harmful purposes. In some cases, conflicts
between indigenous peoples and researchers arise because the two
groups have disparate systems of thought. In other cases, the conflicts
arise because the dominant society has different goals than the
indigenous peoples do, and there is disagreement over the concepts of
“benefit” or “harm.” As this section demonstrates, these two sets of
conflicts have persisted in U.S. society since the nineteenth century. In
the text below, the Article first discusses the differences between
Western and indigenous thought as to the categories of knowledge that
inform human experience. This provides the foundation necessary to
understand “epistemic” forms of injustice. The Article will then discuss
the impact of nineteenth century science policy upon indigenous
peoples, and its continuing legacy in modern public policy discourse.
A.

The Differences Between Western and Indigenous Thought

Western thought, at least since the Enlightenment era, has worked to
separate science, ethics, and religion into separate domains and to create
distinctive principles to govern each of them.9 Ethics is generally placed
within the discipline of philosophy.10 The analytical tradition of Western
philosophy has developed a secular form of rationalism to test the
normative aspects of specific policies, thereby determining whether
certain actions—like human subject research—are beneficial or harmful

8. See, e.g., Editorial, Who Owns the Past?, SCI. AM., (Mar. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=who-owns-the-past (arguing that repatriation
rules are too favorable to American Indian communities and jeopardize the interests of science).
9. Professor Daniel Wildcat describes this separation as a “schizophrenic” approach to
metaphysics, comparing the holistic frameworks of Native epistemologies. See VINE DELORIA, JR.
& DANIEL R. WILDCAT, POWER AND PLACE: INDIAN EDUCATION IN AMERICA 47–55 (2001).
10. See generally THOMAS A. MAPPES & DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1–2 (6th ed.
2005) (discussing ethics as a philosophical discipline devoted to the study of morality).
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to human beings.11
The analytical tradition of Western philosophy is quite
complementary to scientific thought, as science is devoted to generating
hypotheses that can be confirmed or disproved, and generating a factual
basis for what we understand as the truths of our natural world.12 These
truths include our world’s structure, form, and mode of operation.13
Religion once served as both the dominant force within Western
European thought and as the basis to assess ethical action.14 However,
today it has been segregated into the domain of “faith.”15 Consequently,
within secular American democracy, religion is formally excluded from
public life and relegated to the area of “personal conscience.”16 A
principle of “toleration” pervades, rather than any robust attempt to
marry religious and secular precepts.
In comparison, most traditional Native societies did not separate their
systems of thought into separate domains of “religion,” “philosophy,”
and “science,” although their epistemologies contain all of those
functions.17 To the contrary, many Native societies operate within a
holistic understanding of the rules and responsibilities that govern the
relations between people and all components of the natural world,
whether human or non-human.18
This functional interdependency often influences tribal governance
structures.19 Some Native peoples were and are governed by
11. See id.
12. See generally KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIC DISCOVERY (2d ed. 1968)
(characterizing effective scientific method as disproving hypotheses through inductive processes:
each time a prediction based upon a theory is correct, the theory survives).
13. See Frederick Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 3–8 (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977).
14. WILLIAM WISHART, THAT CERTAIN AND UNCHANGEABLE DIFFERENCE BETWIXT MORAL
GOOD AND EVIL: A SERMON PREACH’D BEFORE THE SOCIETIES FOR THE REFORMATION OF
MANNERS, AT SALTERS-HALL; ON MONDAY THE 3D OF JULY, 1732, 33–34 (1732).
15. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemia Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S.
Nelson, Comm. Members, Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510
(Merril D. Peterson ed., (1984)) (“[T]he whole American people [have] declared that their
legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.”).
16. Of course, religion continues to have a significant “informal” impact on public policy, as the
recent controversy over women’s reproductive rights demonstrates. See Rachael N. Pine & Silvia A.
Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 432 (1992).
17. See generally DONALD L. FIXICO, THE AMERICAN INDIAN MIND IN A LINEAR WORLD (2003).
18. See Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1985).
19. See generally DUANE CHAMPAGNE, AMERICAN INDIAN SOCIETIES: STRATEGIES AND
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theocracies.20 Others maintain secular and religious forms of government
that interact to regulate the group’s domestic affairs.21 Similarly, the
group’s overall identity expresses itself both culturally and politically,
and is closely associated with the group’s traditional lands and
resources.22 Indigenous communities generally possess a great deal of
“scientific” knowledge about their local environments due to the length
of time they have lived on the lands and their subsistence-based
traditional lifeways.23 This “traditional ecological knowledge,” however,
is often inseparable from the ethical commands of appropriate resource
use.24 For example, many Native peoples in the Pacific Northwest
maintain an impressive scientific knowledge of the wild salmon runs and
their cycle from ocean to inland waterways.25 However, they also
consider salmon to be one of their First Foods and a sacred resource,
describing salmon within their indigenous language as a distinct
“people.”26 Thus, the salmon harvest may be viewed “scientifically” as a
set of management strategies designed to promote sustainability of a
“resource.” But, it would be equally accurate to view tribal salmon
management as an ethical system with corresponding rights and duties
between the human and non-human “peoples” that affects systems of
governance.
Indigenous identity is intergenerational.27 This means that the
contemporary people honor duties and obligations to their ancestors and
to the future unborn generations.28 Although these categories of human
beings are not currently lives in being, they nonetheless have an identity
and are deserving of respect and protection.29 The essence of these
relationships—with land, ancestral or future generations, or other living
beings—is sometimes described as a “spiritual” connection between the
CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL (1985).
20. See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 383 (6th ed. 2010).
21. See CHAMPAGNE, supra note 19, at 51
22. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 282–85 (1996).
23. See generally GREGORY CAJETE, NATIVE SCIENCE: NATURAL LAWS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
(1999).
24. See Tsosie, supra note 22.
25. JAMES A. LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON
CRISIS 37 (2001).
26. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 90 (2d ed. 1994).
27. See Tsosie, supra note 22, at 286–87.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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indigenous peoples and the various components of the universe.30 The
spiritual nature of these relationships represents a fundamental
metaphysical understanding about life and the source of animation,
which is understood as energy or movement.31 Such a concept cannot be
neatly distilled into contemporary scientific principles associated with a
mechanistic understanding of the universe, such as the laws of physics or
chemistry.32
However, these thought systems should not be conflated with a
particular “religious view” about “God” or divine commandments. Each
indigenous people maintains its own religious system, with a unique set
of ceremonial and ritual practices. Yet, indigenous peoples throughout
the world are unified by a particular understanding of the natural world,
which the late Vine Deloria, Jr., termed a distinct “metaphysics.”33 As
Vine Deloria noted, this understanding does not correspond to any
existing category within Western thought.34
These fundamental differences in epistemology must be
acknowledged in order to truly understand the conflicts between
scientists and indigenous peoples. In addition, as Professor Leroy Little
Bear has observed, the concept of science itself is one that is culturally
relative.35 What is understood as “science” depends upon the cultural
worldview of the definer.36 Little Bear contends that “Western
paradigmatic views of science are largely about measurement using
Western mathematics” as a model for what constitutes “reality.”37 This
model, of course, omits “the sacredness, the livingness, the soul of the
world.”38 It treats these qualities, which indigenous peoples know to be
real based on their own observations over centuries, as non-existent.
Little Bear defines science on a more fundamental level as the
“pursuit of knowledge,” and claims that Native peoples and Western
peoples equally participate in this pursuit.39 However, they do so in

30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See generally DELORIA & WILDCAT, supra note 9 (discussing the differences between
Western and indigenous metaphysics).
33. Id. at 1–6.
34. Id.
35. Leroy Little Bear, Foreword to GREGORY CAJETE, NATIVE SCIENCE: NATURAL LAWS OF
INTERDEPENDENCE, at ix (1999).
36. Id.
37. Id. at ix.
38. Id. at ix–x.
39. Id. at xi.
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different ways and with different understandings of the universe.40 In
this way, the effort of Western scientists to define the parameters of a
valid “pursuit of knowledge” may negate alternative accounts that would
reveal valuable information. Another danger is that Western scientists
will seek an incomplete form of knowledge and perhaps unwittingly
endanger the environment or human health. This is one problem with
contemporary scientific innovation that seeks to mine indigenous
“traditional knowledge” but rejects the ethical constraints that
indigenous cultural norms place on such knowledge.41
In sum, many conflicts between scientists and indigenous peoples
result from fundamental differences on what “science” encompasses and
what forms of knowledge might be used to access information for
society’s benefit.42 A second set of conflicts arises from the use of
science as a tool of public policy. In the public policy sense, science
becomes a tool to effectuate a particular set of interests. As the following
discussion demonstrates, conflicts between Western scientists and
indigenous peoples typically arise because indigenous peoples are
treated as the “objects” of Western scientific discovery rather than as
equal participants in the creation of knowledge or public policy (as a
shared endeavor). This is not the fault of science or scientists. It is
largely the fault of a public policy discourse that uses terms such as
“knowledge” and “benefit” as though they are neutral and fully capable
of intercultural exchange. In fact, the terms are often used as political
devices to advance or suppress particular interests and values.
B.

The Impact of Nineteenth Century Science Policy upon Indigenous
Peoples

Although science policy has experienced normative shifts over the
past two centuries, the practice of using science to privilege particular

40. Id.
41. For example, there is an active international effort underway to gather indigenous
environmental knowledge for use in adaptation planning. The thought is that traditional knowledge
can be “tested” under Western scientific standards to determine whether it is “accurate,” and if it is,
it can be incorporated into adaptation plans to deal with the problem of climate change. Panels on
Indigenous and Local Knowledge for Adaption, at the Climate Adaptation Futures: Second
International Climate Change Adaptation Conference (May 29, 2012). See also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT (forthcoming 2013) (this report will
contain a chapter on this subject).
42. I will intentionally differentiate “information” from “knowledge.” There are many ways to
access information. However, systems of knowledge are necessary to assemble and categorize that
information in ways that are useful to human societies.
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social interests continues.43 In addition, the policies of past eras continue
to impact Native peoples.44 This claim is best understood in relation to
the genesis of American science as a public policy tool in the nineteenth
century. It was this era that had the most enduring impact on the rights
of indigenous peoples in the United States. Indeed, the frameworks
developed in the nineteenth century continue to influence contemporary
domestic policies, sometimes in ways that policymakers do not see or
appreciate.
The nineteenth century was America’s enlightenment era, and the
scientific quest for “new knowledge and understanding” was pivotal to
the formation of a new nation, as demonstrated by the Lewis and Clark
Expedition of 1803. The Lewis and Clark Expedition is generally
understood as an undertaking to map the lands that the United States
acquired through the Louisiana Purchase. However, for indigenous
peoples, the expedition meant much more than that. The Lewis and
Clark Expedition incorporated the Doctrine of Discovery in a literal
sense to claim the aboriginal homelands of indigenous nations as the
sovereign territory of the United States.45 However, in a symbolic sense,
the Lewis and Clark Expedition used the trope of discovery to legitimize
the acquisition of new knowledge about particular subjects, including
indigenous peoples.46 Discovery has remained a dominant theme of
scientific inquiry and one that is protected by the United States
Constitution, which is the foundation for property rights in technology
and innovation.47 Thus, for indigenous peoples, “discovery” is a theme
that has operated continuously within American policy to impair their
rights to land and cultural heritage.48
The history of the Lewis and Clark Expedition proves these points.
On January 18, 1803, President Thomas Jefferson sent a confidential
message to Congress recommending a Western exploratory expedition to
give the United States the information necessary to acquire these
uncharted lands.49 At that time, other European sovereigns had claimed
43. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part III.
45. James V. Fenelon & Mary Louise Defender-Wilson, Voyage of Domination, “Purchase” as
Conquest, Sakakawea for Savagery: Distorted Icons from Misrepresentations of the Lewis and
Clark Expedition, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 85, 87 (2004).
46. See Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage? Art, Artifacts, and the Right to
Cultural Survival, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION,
AND COMMERCE 3, 11 (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009).
47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 11.
49. Confidential Message from Thomas Jefferson to Congress Recommending a Western
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the lands through “discovery.”50 The popular mythology of the day
posited that these remote lands were the home of wooly mastodons,
erupting volcanoes, and “men of a savage race.”51 Jefferson’s message to
Congress was less imaginative and much more instrumental. Jefferson
specifically identified a need to acquire further information about the
Indian tribes residing in these areas.52 Jefferson noted that Indian tribes
were generally becoming very dissatisfied with the diminution of their
territories by European settlement and were actively resisting further
land transfers.53 Jefferson advised that federal Indian policy should
incentivize Indians to adopt a “civilized” agricultural lifestyle, which
required less land than hunting.54 In addition, Jefferson encouraged the
use of trading houses, which would invoke within the Indian people a
desire to acquire trade goods and ideally would also place them in debt.55
Jefferson theorized that this debt would force them to enter land
exchanges as a means of paying off their debts.56 Congress quietly
approved Jefferson’s request on February 28, 1803, allocating the sum of
$3000 to fund the Corps of Discovery, which would be led by
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark.57
A few months later, on April 30, 1803, Jefferson signed a treaty with
France, concluding the Louisiana Purchase, which effectively doubled
the United States’ territory.58 Rather than being a covert expedition
through foreign territory, the Lewis and Clark Expedition was publicized

Exploring Expedition (Jan. 18, 1803), in RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
MULTIRACIAL AMERICA 184, 184 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000); see also Rebecca Tsosie, How
the Land was Taken: The Legacy of the Lewis and Clark Expedition for Native Nations, in
AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW 247 (George Horse Capture et
al. eds., 2007).
50. Id.
51. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 247.
52. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 443, 536–38 (2005); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian
Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 79 (2005) (noting Jefferson granted 3000 land patents in his two years as
governor).
53. Jefferson, supra note 49, at 190.
54. Id.
55. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 247.
56. Id.
57. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1441, 1462 (1998). See Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, §3, 2 Stat. 206.
58. Colin Elman, Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to
Regional Hegemony, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 563, 568 (2004).

07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1144

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/7/2012 7:38 PM

[Vol. 87:1133

as a survey of “American-owned land.”59 In this way, the Lewis and
Clark Expedition epitomized the “Enlightenment” thinking that
Jefferson espoused: “the triumph of reason, the rightness of nature, and
the improvement of society through knowledge.”60
Jefferson asked Lewis and Clark to find a navigable waterway from
St. Louis to the Pacific Ocean.61 Jefferson also asked them to make
contact with the Indians they encountered and document their habits,
both to record examples of human beings living in a natural state and to
ascertain the best mode of transacting business with them to further the
interests of the United States.62 Furthermore, he instructed Lewis and
Clark to scientifically document all the plant and animal species they
encountered and map the landscape’s key features.63 This scientific
expedition had a direct and enduring effect on indigenous peoples. They
were studied as objects of scientific inquiry, much like the region’s
plants and animals.64 Although tribal lands were annexed to the United
States through the treaty with France,65 the Indian Nations had no right
as nations to consent or object.66 The European Doctrine of Discovery
only pertained to “civilized nations” that could acquire “title” to newly
discovered lands merely by virtue of being the first to “discover” the
lands and establish a minimal settlement upon them.67
The Doctrine of Discovery may have originated in the international
law authorizing European colonialism, but it was ultimately incorporated
into domestic law.68 In the 1823 case Johnson v. M’Intosh,69 Chief
59. Lewis
and
Clark,
Inside
the
Corps,
Circa
1803,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/lewisandclark/inside/idx_cir.html (last visited July 12, 2012) [hereinafter Lewis
and Clark, Inside the Corps].
60. Michael Mooney, Foreword to STEPHEN DOW BECKHAM, THE LITERATURE OF THE LEWIS
AND CLARK EXPEDITION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ESSAYS 7 (2003).
61. Lewis and Clark, Inside the Corps, supra note 59.
62. President Thomas Jefferson’s Instructions to Captain Meriwether Lewis (June 20, 1803),
available at http://www.library.csi.cuny.edu/dept/history/lavender/jefflett.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2012).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON,
LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 71–73 (2006).
66. Id. at 10.
67. The Doctrine of Discovery was applied to dispossess Native peoples of their lands in the U.S.,
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, albeit with some key distinctions. Aboriginal people in
Australia, for example, were not recognized as having any right to occupy their lands until the
historic Mabo decision in 1992. Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992), 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
68. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
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Justice John Marshall held that the United States acquired the title by
discovery as the successor to Great Britain, and that the Indian Nations
had only a “title of occupancy,” which could be extinguished by the
United States through “purchase or by conquest.”70 At the material level,
the Lewis and Clark Expedition gave the United States the information it
needed to extinguish Native land titles and promote westward expansion
by white settlers71—the only group entitled to U.S. citizenship at the
time.72
At the level of ideology, the Lewis and Clark Expedition appropriated
Native places and identities to give birth to the United States as a
modern nation. In the process, Native lands, cultures and political
identities were claimed, discarded, or transformed into those of
“America.” While the material impact of this “voyage of discovery” is
visible in the tangible appropriation of Native lands that followed the
Expedition, its ideological impact is more subtle. For example, as Lewis
and Clark mapped the mountains, valleys and rivers of the region, they
discarded the names already given to these places by Native peoples and
substituted names of importance to them, for example, “Clark’s Fork.”
This re-naming process constitutes a form of “cultural trespass,” in
which indigenous understandings of place are transformed into
American understandings. Specifically, this occurs when the Native
stories attached to place names—including stories about the creation of
the people, their migrations, and their experiences over time—are lost or

69. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
70. Id. at 587.
71. See, e.g., William Nichols, Lewis and Clark Probe the Heart of Darkness, 49 AM. SCHOLAR
94, 94, 96 (1979–1980). Professor Nichols quotes Jefferson’s instructions to Lewis and Clark to
gather from the Indians:
the names of the nations & their numbers;
the extent & limits of their possessions;
their relations with other tribes or nations;
their language, traditions, monuments;
their ordinary occupations in agriculture, fishing, hunting, war, arts & the implements for
these;
their food, clothing, & domestic accommodations;
the diseases prevalent among them, & the remedies they use;
moral & physical circumstances which distinguish them from the tribes we know;
peculiarities in their laws, customs & dispositions;
and articles of commerce they may need or furnish & to what extent.
Id at 96. In addition, Jefferson urged Lewis and Clark “to learn what they could of ‘the state of
morality, religion & information among them’ so that those who set out to ‘civilize & instruct them’
would be able to adapt their methods to the customs of the societies they proposed to change.” Id.
72. See Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
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subsumed within the “American” narrative of creation.73
This “remapping” process significantly impacted Native identity.74
The United States annexed tribal lands and renamed them as the lands of
the United States. Native American peoples inhabiting these lands were
involuntarily incorporated into the United States not as citizens, but as
“wards” of the federal government.75
This “guardian/ward” relationship is a cornerstone of federal Indian
law. This is represented in the Cherokee cases, which, like Johnson v.
M’Intosh, are also authored by Chief Justice John Marshall.76 The
Cherokee cases stated that as the “guardian,” the United States had the
power to coerce Native peoples into accepting the “arts of civilization.”77
Thus the United States maintained the exclusive power of regulating
trade with them.78 Because all other purchases were excluded, this power
to regulate trade resulted in the maximum transfer of land to the United
States. The United States carefully employed a combined policy of war
and peace to coerce the tribes’ submission as “dependents” of the United
States.79 The Lewis and Clark Expedition actually followed a formal
protocol in which the “captains would explain to the tribal leaders that
their land now belonged to the United States”80 and that President
Jefferson was their new “great father.”81 The captains would then give
the Indian leader a “peace medal,” with Jefferson on one side and two
hands clasping each other on the reverse side, as well as trade goods.82
The Corps men would then march in uniform, shooting their guns, in a
parade of military strength and unity.83
The journal entries made by Lewis and Clark documented the Indian

73. See generally KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE
AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996); RODNEY FREY, STORIES THAT MAKE THE WORLD: ORAL
LITERATURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES OF THE INLAND NORTHWEST (1995).
74. The theme of “remapping” was the subject of the recent Federal Bar Association’s annual
Indian law conference. Mapping Indian Law and Policy, Panel at the Federal Bar Association
Thirty-Seventh Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 19–20, 2012).
75. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
76. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.
77. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
78. Id. at 553, 556.
79. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000).
80. The Native Americans, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/lewisandclark/native (last visited July 12,
2012).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
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peoples’ “moral character” by listing the Native peoples’ perceived traits
and comparing those traits with the traits of “civilized men.”84 In fact,
Thomas Jefferson was a proponent of the view that white Europeans
were at the apex of civilization by virtue of their moral and intellectual
superiority.85 Jefferson posited that Indians had the natural capacity to
adopt the habits of civilization.86 He distinguished the Indians’ ability to
“adopt civilization” from what he saw as the more primitive AfricanAmericans, who were so far below the moral capacity of a white man
that they had little hope for anything beyond the status of slaves to the
white race.87 Lewis and Clark identified categories of good and bad
Indians in reference to whether they had the ability to be friendly to
whites and adopt the habits of civilization.88 This ultimately became the
touchstone for U.S. Indian policy, which encouraged treaty cessions with
compliant Native leaders (the “Peace Policy”) and used military
expeditions to forcibly appropriate tribal lands from resistant Native
leaders (the “War Policy”).89
Although the Lewis and Clark Expedition seems quite distant in the
United States’ collective memory, the theme of discovery is alive and
well in contemporary science policy. Indigenous peoples have been
uniquely harmed by this theme of discovery. Of all the groups that may
have been disadvantaged within American society as a historical matter,
indigenous peoples are the group that continues to be treated as
“objects” of scientific inquiry, rather than co-creators in the categories of
knowledge that inform scientific inquiry.90
84. Nichols, supra note 71, at 96.
85. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 15.
86. Id.
87. See Notes of Thomas Jefferson on the State of Virginia, Query XIV (1787), in RACE AND
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A MULTIRACIAL AMERICA 100, supra note 49, at 100–02
(excerpting notes written by Jefferson in 1787 offering his perception of the fundamental moral
attributes of black slaves and Indians). Jefferson’s line of thinking was ultimately incorporated into
the Supreme Court’s infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), which
found that Native peoples could be “naturalized” to citizenship if they gave up their tribal relations
and became civilized, while African-Americans lacked the fundamental capacity to ever become
“citizens.” Id. at 403–06 (distinguishing Indians as a “free and independent people,” despite their
“uncivilized” nature, who could be naturalized to U.S. citizenship if Congress took the requisite
steps to do so).
88. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 16.
89. Donald Fixico, Federal and State Policies and American Indians, in A COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY 379, 382–83 (Philip J. Deloria & Neal Salisbury eds., 2004).
90. See generally Debra Harry, Indigenous Peoples and Gene Disputes, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
147 (2009) (discussing legal battle of the Havasupai Tribe for improper usage of medical data and
Oxford University’s failure to gain informed consent of the Nuu-cha-nulth Tribe to utilize blood
samples for research).
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Contemporary Science Policy and the Legacy of the Past

Most modern scientists have rejected the overt scientific racism of the
nineteenth century, which differentiated the moral and intellectual
capacity of the different races.91 The point of the discussion above is not
to resurrect an embarrassing history, but to show how prevailing notions
of what is scientifically “true” become central to the development of
specific laws and policies. For example, the scientific racial hierarchy of
the nineteenth century validated the differential treatment of human
beings within American society in the exercise of fundamental rights.
Such differential treatment occurred with the right to become a citizen
through naturalization, the right to marry, the right to enter contracts,
and the right to hold property.92 Although the post-Civil War
constitutional amendments banned slavery and called for AfricanAmericans to enjoy “equal” citizenship, state governments relied upon
the Supreme Court’s perverted logic in Plessy v. Ferguson,93 which
distinguished between “political” and “social” rights, to maintain the
second-class status of African-Americans until the 1960s.94 Scientific
studies of gender differences validated policies according women
different standards for civil rights—such as voting rights—and
employment.95 It took the Civil War, a set of constitutional amendments,
and a century of legal efforts to vindicate the civil rights of African
Americans and other minorities to equal citizenship. However, the
political status of Indians as “wards” and their exclusion from U.S.
constitutional citizenship (though the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act
naturalized Indians to citizenship by virtue of federal law) has
complicated the notion of equal citizenship for Native peoples.96
91. ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 2–3 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state statutes banning
miscegenation between the races were unconstitutional, but observing that states justified such
statutes on a perceived need to prevent the “corruption” of the white race through interbreeding with
“inferior” races).
93. 163 U.S. 537 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment ensures “legal” equality
between the races, not social equality, and upholding a Louisiana law that required separate railway
carriages for “white and colored races”).
94. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levitt, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
627, 635–66 (1993).
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law that imposed a
maximum hours limit upon women employees and finding that the physical and emotional
differences of men and women, which were medically substantiated, justified the restriction upon
women in their individual capacity to contract for employment).
96. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Challenge of “Differentiated Citizenship”: Can State Constitutions
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Significantly, several American philosophers at the turn of the century
rejected the scientific racism of the nineteenth century as unethical and
immoral.97 This led to a shift in scientific ethics that persisted until the
McCarthy Era of the 1950s.98 At that time, many progressive scientists,
including Albert Einstein, were targeted as “communists,” and had their
careers and livelihoods placed in jeopardy.99 The impact of science as a
tool of social justice was minimized as research funding became
conditioned upon scientists adhering to an apparent “neutrality” of
perspective.100 Research funding continues to play an important role in
promoting scientific inquiry. Today, private industry often funds
scientists to assess the environmental and health risks of products and
industrial development. Activist organizations may also employ
scientists to generate studies to contest these findings.101 The disparity
between the two sets of studies often mystifies consumers and
complicates the work of public policymakers.
Although the active scientific racism of the nineteenth century was
ultimately rejected as a tool of social policy, it remains an important
dynamic for Native peoples. Few people would deny that the 1868
Surgeon General’s Order directing U.S. military personnel to collect
Indian crania and other body parts from deceased Indians and ship them
to the Army Medical Museum for scientific study constituted racism.102
However, as of 2012, that original historic injustice has now resulted in
over 118,000 sets of Native American remains being housed in federal
agency and museum collections under the label of “culturally
unidentifiable” human remains.103 Many of these remains are the bodies
of Indian people that were murdered, dismembered, and had their
Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 199 (2003).
97. Dr. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Lecture at Arizona State University (Jan. 20, 2012) (citing
SHARON BEDER, GLOBAL SPIN: THE CORPORATE ASSAULT ON ENVIRONMENTALISM (1998);
KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, TAKING ACTION, SAVING LIVES: OUR DUTIES TO PROTECT
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2007)).
98. Id.
99. JESSICA WANG, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY: SCIENTISTS, ANTICOMMUNISM,
AND THE COLD WAR 125 (1999).
100. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If academic research is required to
validate any departure from strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in the area of race will be
impossible despite its urgency.”).
101. Studies of the impact of nuclear power plants are a good case in point.
102. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992).
103. WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW
CASES EVER DECIDED 258 (2010) (documenting the number of culturally unidentifiable human
remains in the custody of federal agencies and museums as 118,833 as of 2008).
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personal belongings plundered by U.S. servicemen on the battlefield.104
The military shipped the human remains to Washington, D.C. in crates
without any way to identify the names or, in many cases, even the tribal
nations of the deceased.105 Their personal objects became the “property”
of the very men who plundered their bodies.106 Museums collected many
of these pieces over time through purchase and donations.107 This
gruesome history underlies today’s Native American repatriation
movement. The scientists who seek to study the deceased Indian
peoples’ bones assert that such study may produce new knowledge that
will provide a broad public benefit.108 This argument is akin to the
arguments “craniologists” made in the nineteenth century. The
“craniologists” argued that the measurement and dissection of human
heads could lead to important knowledge about the fundamental capacity
of the different races.109
As Section III discusses, the themes of nineteenth century science
policy continue to shape domestic environmental policy, health policy,
and repatriation policy. The theme of discovery is more apparent in
some areas of public policy than others, and this Article does not attempt
to argue otherwise. The central point is that all of these areas of national
policy are informed by science, and all of them significantly impact
indigenous peoples. Because of this, contemporary science policy often
manifests as “injustice” to Native peoples. Of course, the terms “justice”
and “injustice” are used loosely, frequently serving as mere polemical
tools in modern social discourse. Therefore, the next section of this
Article will construct an argument about the specific nature of the
injustice before discussing several legal controversies that illustrate the
point.
II.

SCIENCE AND ETHICS: THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE

Many contemporary philosophers have invoked the principle of
justice to examine potential unfairness in the distribution of goods, such

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8 (arguing that culturally unidentifiable human
remains are the “shared patrimony of all Americans and, indeed, all peoples everywhere”).
109. Reginald Horsman, Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nineteenth
Century, 27 AM. Q. 152, 159 (1975).
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as information or education, that are necessary to ensure the full
realization of liberties by all citizens within civil society.110 However, it
is not always clear what “justice” entails. Under the pervasive utilitarian
calculus that has informed many of our policies, substantial benefits to a
large segment of society are asserted to justify some disadvantages to a
few. For example, in the 1970s, the American Academy of Sciences
designated Navajo lands in the Four Corners region as a “national
sacrifice area,” acknowledging the permanent damage and pollution
caused by coal strip mining.111 Those lands are home to hundreds of
Navajo residents,112 and the health impacts of the mining industry have
been severe and ongoing.113 Is this an instance of “injustice”?
It is not easy to reach a conclusion on the issue because tribal
governments often depend upon the jobs and revenues that come to the
reservation through mining operations.114 In many other parts of the
country, the impacts of environmental degradation on particular
communities inspired the “environmental justice” (EJ) movement.115
The EJ movement found significant environmental impacts concentrated
among many poor and often minority communities.116 The EJ movement
asserted that these disadvantaged groups faced a disproportionate
amount of the burdens that toxic industry causes, such as nearby landfills
and air pollution, while affluent communities receive most of the
benefits.117 One could call this a form of “racism,” but of a type far more
subtle than its nineteenth century counterparts. For this reason, the term
“environmental justice” seems to be preferred to that of “environmental
racism.”118 Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
incorporated environmental justice concerns into the policies that
determine whether a given industry may build and operate a toxic or
110. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? (2009).
111. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate
Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1630 (2007).
112. History, NAVAJO NATION, http://www.navajo-nsn.gov/history.htm (last visited July 12,
2012).
113. See, e.g., Susan E. Dawson, Navajo Uranium Workers and the Effects of Occupational
Illnesses: A Case Study, 51 HUM. ORG. 389 (1992).
114. See Tsosie, supra note 2.
115. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging The Gap Between Environmental Laws And
“Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 225–27 (1997).
116. See id. at 223.
117. See KATHRYN MUTZ ET AL., JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2002).
118. The federal policy uses “environmental justice,” and not “environmental racism,” indicating
that this is the preferred term in policymaking. See Environmental Justice, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last visited July 12, 2012).
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dangerous facility within a community.119
The EPA’s response to the EJ movement represents an attempt to
mitigate social inequities through domestic law and policy. The
theoretical work on justice, however, is more provocative and promotes
a more nuanced analysis of the public policy response. For example,
John Rawls’ influential theory of justice specifically rejects the
utilitarian calculus, asserting that “in a just society the liberties of equal
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.”120
Rawls’ account would argue in favor of a public policy that ensured an
equal distribution of risks and benefits. However, society can only
achieve this model of justice if it truly appreciates and understands the
interests and rights particular social policies might impair, despite a fair
and neutral appearance under prevailing standards.
This section of the Article draws upon Miranda Fricker’s
philosophical work121 to explain how “epistemic” forms of injustice—
those injustices relating to the categories of knowledge and experience
that law and public policy sanctions—affect indigenous peoples. This
Article will also discuss why the resulting harms caused by epistemic
injustice are often invisible within the domestic legal and public policy
arenas. Section II provides the foundation for Section III’s analysis of
specific case studies. Section II first describes the problem of epistemic
injustice and then explores two forms of epistemic injustice that
indigenous peoples have experienced within domestic law and public
policy. Section II then associates the key components of Fricker’s theory
of epistemic injustice with the Rawlsian claim for equal citizenship,
which is the predominant focus of justice theory.
A.

Understanding Epistemic Injustice

As demonstrated above, many of the conflicts between indigenous
peoples and scientists revolve around fundamental differences in their
respective systems of thought, particularly as these concern the
categories of experience that are relevant to understanding the natural
world. These epistemological differences, in turn, heavily influence the
formation of public policy and can operate to cause forms of “epistemic
injustice” for the affected groups.
Within the United States, domestic policymaking is dependent upon a
119. Id.
120. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (1971).
121. FRICKER, supra note 7.
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model of secular pluralism.122 Secular pluralism privileges Western
European understandings of science, economics, and technology as the
appropriate constructs for domestic public policy.123 Although
indigenous peoples have analogous concepts, such as traditional
ecological knowledge,124 these understandings are routinely disregarded
within public policy discourse.125 Policymakers and jurists tend to
understand indigenous cultural worldviews as “religious beliefs” and
marginalize these interests as matters of “private conscience.”126 To the
extent that Western society excludes indigenous worldviews from
important social interactions within domestic policy structures,
indigenous peoples are likely to suffer epistemic forms of injustice. In
most cases, these harms will not be seen or appreciated by others,
meaning that the legal system will be unable to provide any redress.
Miranda Fricker’s account of “epistemic injustice” facilitates an
understanding of the subtle ways in which indigenous peoples have been
excluded from full participation in shaping domestic law and public
policy. Although Fricker’s account is potentially illuminating for all
societies, this Article discusses its utility for understanding the effect of
U.S. public policy upon Native peoples in this country.
Fricker’s work examines the impacts of our basic social interactions,
many of which center on knowledge and social experience.127 She
maintains that there are “ethical aspects of two of our most basic
everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling
them, and making sense of our own social experiences.”128 These
practices, in turn, implicate the operation of social power in epistemic
interactions, promoting an inquiry into the “politics of epistemic
practice.”129 The politics of epistemic practice determine how social
power—or social disadvantage—operates to produce injustice in our
everyday epistemic practices.
Social power, of course, is a fact of social discourse. In that sense,

122. I discuss secular pluralism in relation to environmental policy in Tsosie, supra note 22, at
255–68.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. I discuss this in relation to public lands management in Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict
Between the Public Trust and the Indian Trust Doctrines: Public Land Policy and Native Nations,
39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003).
127. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2.
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Fricker argues, we need not describe social power as “bad.”130 Instead,
Fricker encourages us to notice when social power is being exercised
and then ask “who or what is controlling whom, and why.”131 Moreover,
some social interactions will hinge upon the participants’ mutual
understanding of their social identity, which might indicate that some
form of “identity power” is at work.132 For example, this could occur
when a man makes some use of his male identity to influence a woman,
perhaps by patronizing or otherwise intimidating her.133 This subtle form
of domination requires an explicit focus, and Fricker’s theory of
epistemic injustice provides such a lens.
Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice has critically important
implications. The law is a social institution that broadly invokes power
relations between the government and its citizens and between the U.S.
and Native Nations. In the former case, the government and its citizens
share a sense of identity within civic society, although they may also
depart from this shared conception in the exercise of pluralism or
multiculturalism. In the latter case, however, the essential interaction of
the two groups (U.S. and Native Nations) does not rest upon a shared
conception of identity. In fact, the principle of indigenous selfdetermination depends upon the ability of an indigenous people to
express its own identity as an autonomous group and to negotiate the
terms of its political relationship with the given nation-state. Identitypower is perhaps the single most important dynamic of this relationship.
Thus, one must carefully ascertain when epistemic injustice operates to
suppress an indigenous group’s ability to define its own identity.
According to Fricker, this can occur in the form of “testimonial” or
“hermeneutical” injustice.134 As the following discussion demonstrates,
testimonial injustice arises when someone is wronged in his or her
capacity as a giver of knowledge, while hermeneutical injustice arises
when someone is wronged in his or her capacity as a subject of social
understanding.135
B.

Testimonial Injustice
Of the two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice is

130. Id. at 14.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 4, 7.
135. Id. at 7.
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perhaps more basic to legal theory and practice. After all, lawyers
commonly invoke testimony as “proof” that something did or did not
take place. However, it is necessary to examine why we qualify some
persons as “capable” of giving testimony while we exclude others from
this privilege. It is also necessary to understand that we may accord this
privilege as a matter of institutional practice, or it may become part of
less formal social interactions. In either case, these epistemic practices
can impair indigenous peoples’ rights and interests. According to
Fricker, testimonial injustice commonly arises from a dysfunction in a
testimonial practice that is related to identity.136 For example, listeners
may evaluate some speakers as more credible due to the speaker’s
gender, age, class, income, accent, or appearance. Conversely, others
will experience a “credibility deficit” due to the same factors.137
Many of these practices exist at the level of informal social
interaction, but others are formalized into our legal, social or political
structures, which leads to “systemic testimonial injustice.”138 An
accepted practice within the American legal system is to qualify a
witness before they may give “expert testimony.”139 The implications of
this can be significant for indigenous peoples. For example, an
indigenous group petitioning for political recognition through the
“federal acknowledgement process” must obtain credible testimony that
the group is, in fact, an “Indian tribe” that merits political recognition.140
Similarly, if an indigenous group claims that a particular sacred place
should be protected as a “Traditional Cultural Property” (TCP) pursuant
to the National Historic Preservation Act, it must secure expert
testimony sufficient to prove this status.141 In either case, a successful
outcome will likely depend upon the “expert” testimony of a trained
academic who has studied the group and can determine whether the
group constitutes “an Indian tribe” or whether the place constitutes a
TCP under the particular statutory or regulatory criteria.142
136. Id. at 4, 14–16.
137. Id. at 17.
138. Id. at 28.
139. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
140. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2012).
141. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (describing
process for identifying traditional cultural properties under the National Historic Preservation Act).
142. Id. at 860–61 (describing affidavits of anthropologists who documented the existence of
TCPs). Also, the required criteria to be acknowledged as a “federally-recognized Indian tribe” are
listed at 25 C.F.R. § 83.7. The National Historic Preservation Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470
(2006) and was amended to include “traditional cultural properties,” in addition to the more
conventional historic buildings and monuments that were originally associated with that statute.
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Courts are unlikely to recognize tribal members as having the same
credibility as an “expert witness,” although certain tribal cultural
practitioners, including tribal historians and traditional healers, may have
recognized cultural expertise in specific areas. Tribal language, oral
tradition, and ceremonial practice are all areas that may contain esoteric
knowledge beyond the comprehension of even the most experienced
academics. The categories of knowledge that cultural practitioners hold
are often invisible within the U.S. legal system. This is because most of
these individuals do not possess formal academic credentials to “prove”
that they possess relevant knowledge for purposes of giving “expert
testimony” in legal proceedings.143
Some might argue that we can overcome testimonial injustice by
increasing our awareness of how the court system treats Native
witnesses or by committing to modify our legal structures to minimize
the unfairness that might result from differential power relations. For
example, the legislative branches can specifically authorize Native
cultural testimony as a form of “expert” testimony, or courts can
interpret evidentiary rules to sustain this practice. However, even when
the law explicitly allows such testimony, the courts must still be willing
to consider this testimony as probative of a specific claim. For example,
the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 authorized tribal claimants
to give testimony on traditional patterns of land use to sustain their
claims against the United States for the appropriation of tribal property
without consent of the tribe.144 Under the statute, such testimony could
be admitted under a variety of theories in order to sustain, for example, a
claim against the government’s taking of a group’s aboriginal title or its
treaty-guaranteed lands.145 However, a common threshold issue might be
whether the group merits compensation as a matter of constitutional
right under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, or whether it is merely
entitled to a lesser form of statutory payment designed to extinguish the

Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
143. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277–78 (1955) (dismissing the
testimony of a traditional leader about the property claim of the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians).
144. The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 authorized tribes to bring five categories of
claims against the United States to redress historic wrongs, including treaty violations and takings of
land, so long as they did so within the statutory time period. Tsosie, supra note 49, at 256–58. The
claims were first processed by the Indian Claims Commission, and then appeals could be taken to
the United States Court of Claims. See id. The statute also authorized tribal claimants for the first
time to use the Court of Claims to obtain relief for wrongs that occurred after the effective date of
the statute, as did the taking of timber in the Tee-Hit-Ton case. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note
20, at 1022–24.
145. Id.
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legal claim. Only the constitutional claim would offer parity with the
legal treatment extended to non-Native claimants when the government
takes their property interests.146
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,147 the tribe brought a Fifth
Amendment takings claim against the United States in connection with
the government’s decision to authorize timber harvesting from the
tribe’s traditional lands in Alaska.148 The United States acquired Alaska
through a treaty with Russia, which, unlike Great Britain, had not
colonized its American territories, casting doubt on whether it had
effectively settled the lands for purposes of claiming title under the
Doctrine of Discovery.149 The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians maintained that they
were the rightful owners of these lands and thus had a property interest
in the timber that sustained their takings claim.150 The Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that the testimony offered by the tribal member
selected to be the group’s expert witness merely proved the tribe’s
“group” claim to the area in accordance with the tribe’s “hunting and
fishing stage of civilization.”151 The Court saw this “primitive” form of
land use as merely establishing the group’s claim to “aboriginal title” on
the same level as other Indians but not establishing a true “property
interest” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.152 Instead, the
Court employed the Doctrine of Discovery to find that the taking of
“Indian title” does not require “just compensation” under the U.S.
Constitution because:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in
return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conqueror’s will that deprived them of their land.153
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the testimony provided by the
tribal witness was based on a shared social experience of “property
rights” informed by Western thought, and it had no resonance with the

146. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
147. 348 U.S. 272.
148. Id. at 314.
149. See generally Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 316, 320–21 (describing evidence as Russia
not “settling” the lands in Alaska, but merely engaging in sporadic trading with the Native peoples).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 287.
152. Id. at 284.
153. Id. at 289–90.
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experience of the Native claimants.154 In that respect, Tee-Hit-Ton raises
Fricker’s second category of epistemic injustice, namely “hermeneutical
injustice.” As the following discussion demonstrates, the dynamic of
hermeneutical injustice is more subtle than testimonial injustice because
it engages the interpretation of social experience. While this may seem
tangential to the law, it is actually quite important for indigenous peoples
because the law reflects the dominant society’s interpretation of relevant
social experience. Not surprisingly, the dominant society’s interpretive
norms routinely exclude indigenous categories of experience.
C.

Hermeneutical Injustice

According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice is “the injustice of
having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from
collective understanding” because the group is structurally prejudiced
and cannot participate on an equal basis in creating a shared meaning for
the social experience.155 Hermeneutical injustice raises difficult
questions because prevailing relations of power can destroy or constrain
the ability of a group to understand its own experience.156 Fricker draws
on the work of feminist scholars to show how the concept of “sexual
harassment” that now constitutes a claim under federal and state
antidiscrimination laws was, for many years, not a visible category of
social experience, let alone a legal cause of action.157 Women lacked
equal power in the workplace, and in that sense, they were
“hermeneutically marginalized” from creating a shared experience of
social meaning.158 Thus, female subordinates had no way to make a
claim for harm based on their experience of “discomfort” at being
patted, kissed, groped, or propositioned by male superiors.159 The harm
simply was not seen or understood by others outside this experience.160
Hermeneutical injustice is what occurs with many Native American
claims to protect aspects of their cultural identity from harms that are not
recognized standard categories of law. In particular, there is currently
not a recognized category within American law to redress cultural harm,

154. Id. at 284.
155. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 7, 153–54.
156. See id. at 7.
157. Id. at 148–52.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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as the following cases demonstrate.161
Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, several Native Alaskan
communities sued Exxon for the destruction of their traditional
subsistence ways of life caused by the massive oil spill because the spill
decimated the fish and wildlife upon which they depended.162 The Ninth
Circuit declined to find a cause of action, distinguishing the tangible
harms to natural resources, which were actionable, from the “intangible”
harms to culture, which were not.163 The Ninth Circuit perceived culture
as merely an “internal” state of mind, positing that “one’s culture—a
person’s way of life—is deeply embedded in the mind and
heart. . . . [C]atastrophic cultural impacts cannot change what is in the
mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a given way of
life.”164 Of course, it is unclear how a group can preserve a cultural “way
of life” when the essential components are destroyed.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, refused to halt a National
Forest Service development plan authorizing a ski facility to pump
treated sewage effluent from Flagstaff to generate artificial snow on a
mountain held sacred by the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe, and several
other tribes in the Southwest.165 The Tribes had filed their claim under
the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),166 which
purports to restore the compelling interest test for any federal action that
places a substantial burden upon religion.167 However, the court found
that the standard under RFRA incorporates existing Supreme Court case
law defining what constitutes a “substantial burden.”168 Consequently,
the court drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,169 which held that the
destruction of indigenous religion arising from a road construction
161. I have written in more detail about cultural harm in other work. See generally Tsosie, supra
note 1.
162. In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
163. Id. at 1197–98.
164. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 182856, at *4 (D. Alaska Mar. 23,
1994), aff’d, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
165. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The plaintiffs
in this case consisted of several Indian tribes throughout the Southwest as well as individual Indian
practitioners and activist organizations. Id. at 1063.
166. Id. at 1066.
167. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (finding that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the actions of state governments).
168. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1074.
169. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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project through a tribal sacred site was not actionable under the First
Amendment because the tribes were free to “believe” as they wanted.170
Thus the court ruled that the Native peoples had no right to condition the
Forest Service in the management of federal public lands.171 The Ninth
Circuit held that the standard to be applied in a RFRA case was the same
as that in a First Amendment case and further found that the roadbuilding project in Lyng could not be distinguished in any meaningful
way from the use of reclaimed wastewater on the San Francisco
Peaks.172 Following the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lyng,
the Ninth Circuit also found that the federal agency was simply
managing its own land to maximize its value for the public benefit.173
The two analyses evoke the sort of utilitarian calculus that justified strip
mining on Navajo lands.
Another example of hermeneutical injustice arose when a Native
Hawaiian group, the Hui Mālama, filed a claim against the U.S.
Department of Navy and the Bishop Museum to protect ancestral human
remains from desecration in connection with the scientific study of the
remains authorized for purposes of preparing an inventory under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.174 Hui
Mālama asserted that the federal defendants had violated federal law by
undertaking scientific research on the remains, and they feared that the
study record would be disclosed to third parties pursuant to requests
under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).175 The Native
claimants argued that the public release of this data, including
photographs of the remains, would cause a profound and serious harm to
the ancestral remains, which maintained an essence as living beings, and
to their descendants.176
The court declined to recognize this claim, finding that although the
ancestral remains were “living” entities within the indigenous belief
system, they were merely de-identified human skeletal remains for
purposes of the privacy exemption within FOIA.177 The Hawaiian case
exemplifies a form of testimonial injustice because the court failed to see
the relevance of the Native claimants’ testimony to establishing an
170. Id. at 447–51.
171. Id.
172. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1072.
173. Id. at 1073.
174. Na Iwi O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995).
175. Id. at 1402–04.
176. Id. at 1409.
177. Id. at 1413.

07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/7/2012 7:38 PM

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

1161

actionable claim. The case also demonstrates a form of hermeneutical
injustice because the Native Hawaiian claimants were structurally
excluded from creating a shared meaning for the doctrine of privacy,
which would operate to protect a living person’s body from being
photographed and put on public display without the individual’s consent.
A final example of hermeneutical injustice can be seen in a very
current event. The Native Village of Kivilina is losing its entire land
base as a result of global climate change and sea level rise.178 Thus far,
the Native Village of Kivilina has not prevailed in its attempt to sue
several oil companies for the harm of public nuisance.179 This is because
the courts have been unable to find any particular liability given the
multiple interactions that are responsible for rising levels of greenhouse
gas emissions.180 Indeed, no cause of action currently exists for the loss
of an entire nation, as many island nations in the South Pacific, such as
Tuvalu, are discovering.181 It is simply outside the realm of our current
understanding, as a global community, to fathom the loss of a sovereign
nation’s entire land base by a “natural” phenomenon like flooding, as
opposed to military conquest.182
All of these cases raise issues of hermeneutical injustice because the
harms asserted include cultural and spiritual claims that do not fall
within an available category of experience or thought within the Western
legal system. However, the harms are felt by indigenous peoples. This is
their experience, and it is shared among many different indigenous
groups because they possess a different understanding of the world.
Each of these indigenous claimants has faced structural prejudice
because they are forced to bring their cause of action under standard
categories of American law that do not reflect a shared understanding of
their social experience, including the asserted harms or benefits of
particular types of conduct. In each of these cases, science has been
utilized to prove the “truth” of a claim for harm. So, for example,
science can measure and quantify the level of a toxic emission that
poisons water or kills fish or wildlife. However, science cannot measure
178. Native Vill. of Kivilina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
179. Kivilina, 696 F.3d at 853.
180. Id. at 854–58.
181. See Tsosie, supra note 111 (discussing potential human rights claims that might be
developed by Island nations in the South Pacific and by indigenous nations in the Arctic who are in
jeopardy of losing their land base and their subsistence ways of life).
182. See Kivilina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880–82 (discussing the difficulty of establishing causation
for the purpose of Article III standing when global warming is attributed to numerous entities over
centuries).

07 - Tsosie Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1162

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/7/2012 7:38 PM

[Vol. 87:1133

the value of “culture” to a people, and consequently, there is no
scientific method to establish “cultural harm.” Thus, the destruction of a
culture or a religion is not legally actionable. Similarly, science can
“prove” that Class I-treated effluent is “safe” for a recreational skier on
the San Francisco Peaks, although science cannot prove the “spiritual
contamination” that will result from the discharge of mortuary fluids into
the reclaimed municipal water source used to create artificial snow. Nor
can science prove that the San Francisco Peaks themselves have a sacred
essence and identity as a living spiritual being or that ancestral human
remains have such qualities. In each case, Western science’s limited
framework is used to justify the exclusion of Native experience for
purposes of establishing a legal cause of action.
D.

Structural Forms of Epistemic Injustice Impair Equal Citizenship

Why should American society care about these structural deficiencies
within its pluralistic democracy? Fricker argues that the capacity to give
knowledge is a fundamental capacity of human beings.183 When a
society treats some groups as incapable of giving knowledge on an equal
basis, it treats those groups as less than fully human, an intrinsic harm.184
Society also hinders the groups’ further development by discounting
their intellectual abilities, an epistemic harm.185 As illustrated by the
Doctrine of Discovery and its incorporation into U.S. law, American
legal and educational institutions have historically treated Western
knowledge as a privileged form of knowledge, discounting the ability of
indigenous peoples to generate knowledge or convey it in process of
public policy discourse.186 In the process, American society has
prevented indigenous peoples from articulating their own social
experience, including the harms they have experienced as a result of the
dominant society’s public policies.
Fricker also encourages societies to care about epistemic justice as an
intellectual or moral virtue.187 Intellectual virtues generally have truth as
their ultimate end, which may be one reason why contemporary
scientists claim a value in studying indigenous knowledge. For example,
some scientists contend that traditional knowledge is of potential utility
to understand biodiversity and its management through adaptation plans,
183. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 44.
184. Id. at 44–45.
185. Id. at 44.
186. See supra notes 46–91 and accompanying text.
187. FRICKER, supra note 7, at 120–21.
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as well as to obtain knowledge about medicinal plants that might be used
to develop pharmaceutical products.188 The utility of indigenous peoples’
traditional knowledge will be “proven” when it accords with Western
science, which is why scientists are now pushing to undertake research
studies on traditional knowledge.189
While intellectual virtue is important, the dominant society must be
aware that its desire to use indigenous knowledge as a means to achieve
a broad public benefit has often resulted in the exploitation of
indigenous peoples. For example, the pharmaceutical company typically
profits from its ability to patent products derived from indigenous
peoples’ knowledge of plants.190 However, intellectual property laws do
not protect indigenous knowledge,191 which means that indigenous
peoples have no way to protect against misuse or misappropriation of
their traditional knowledge. This is largely because U.S. intellectual
property laws protect only new “innovations” and “discoveries,” and
they do not protect the longstanding knowledge held by cultural
communities.192
Fricker compares intellectual virtue with the virtue of compassion,
which is a moral virtue designed to alleviate the suffering of others and
motivate their well-being.193 An ethic of compassion suggests that we
utilize a human rights framework to improve the position of indigenous
peoples within society.194 This would ideally move them out of a
position of disadvantage and powerlessness while honoring the U.S.
Constitution’s stated commitment to protect human dignity and
equality.195 Presumably, indigenous peoples would then be able to enjoy
188. See generally John Reid, Comment, Biopiracy: The Struggle for Traditional Knowledge
Rights, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2010).
189. Several policymakes explicitly made this point at a recent international conference on
climate adaptation attended by this author. See, e.g., Panels at Climate Adaptation Futures: Second
International Climate Change Adaptation Conference (May 29–31, 2012).
190. Reid, supra note 188, at 90.
191. Tsosie, supra note 1, at 398–99.
192. Id. at 399.
193. See FRICKER, supra note 7, at 126 (distinguishing intellectual virtues from ethical virtues
and observing that the latter set of virtues are oriented toward the well-being of others).
194. Human rights law, after all, is premised upon a Kantian notion of equal respect for persons.
See generally Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law &
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-83, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973341. To the extent that public policies
overtly disadvantage minority groups and cause suffering, human rights law counsels nation-states
to act affirmatively to remedy this discrimination.
195. I use the terms “disadvantage” and “powerless” in their political sense. Although there is a
popular belief that Native peoples now enjoy economic power, the benefits of Indian gaming are
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the equal citizenship espoused by American democracy.
III. CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES INVOLVING
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SCIENCE POLICY
Advances in science and technology hold a great deal of promise for
resolving some of the most difficult challenges that confront us in the
contemporary era. However, they also pose significant ethical issues,
particularly in view of the considerable disparities between populations
and nations in their overall capacity to experience the benefits of
technology. In the United States, Native peoples are implicated in public
policy as U.S. citizens and as citizens of sovereign nations.196 Individual
Indians enjoy “equal citizenship” in common with all other United States
citizens,197 and yet they also have a “differentiated” citizenship because
of their membership within tribal Nations that possess a trust
relationship with the United States government.198
These different status relationships are the basis for different rights
claims. In their capacity as U.S. citizens, individual Indians have the
right to enjoy the same liberties as other citizens, including state
services.199 The rights that derive from the federal trust relationship,
however, are different in character. These are political rights that are
expressed collectively through the government-to-government
relationship between the Native Nations and the United States.200 Such
rights may be reflected in treaties or other constitutive agreements, and
they often manifest in a reservation land base, generally held in trust for
the benefit of the tribe and its members.201 They may also be reflected in
the tribes’ associated interests in water, timber, and wildlife resources.202
This section of the Article will discuss the ways in which the
sovereign rights of Native Nations are impacted by U.S. public policy. In
concentrated on relatively few tribes, and the structural inequities that I am discussing in this article
are pervasive and cannot be remedied by wealth transfers.
196. See Tsosie, supra note 96, at 201.
197. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (granting citizenship to all
Indians born in the United States).
198. See Tsosie, supra note 96, at 202.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.
200. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
201. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“As a general rule, Indians enjoy
exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them . . . .”).
202. See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); see
also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983).
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particular, the Article identifies three areas where science policy
continues to heavily impact the rights and interests of indigenous
peoples. While the doctrines governing the specific areas differ, there is
consistency in the themes that have driven national policy over the years
as well as their impact on Native peoples. The three areas are
environmental policy, health policy, and repatriation policy. These are
vast areas of public policy, and this Article does not attempt to give a
comprehensive account of any one area. Nor does the Article purport to
make the broad argument that the Doctrine of Discovery has perpetuated
a dominant colonial attitude in every aspect of U.S. public policy to the
detriment of Indian tribes, although other commentators have
persuasively made this case.203 Rather, this Article selectively discusses
aspects of these policies within their historical context in order to
illustrate the ways in which these policies intersect and impact Native
peoples. In all three areas, the policymakers have excluded or
disregarded the unique interests of Native peoples, causing structural
forms of epistemic harm to tribal governments and Native communities.
A.

Environmental Policy

Within the United States, domestic policy has traditionally employed
a utilitarian calculus to determine the respective rights of Native peoples
and the United States to the lands and resources that were at one time
wholly governed by indigenous law.204 This is demonstrated in
nineteenth century public land policy and in the twentieth century
policies governing environmental regulation and energy development.
1.

The Legacy of Nineteenth Century Land Policy

Nineteenth century federal Indian policy supported the notion that the
manifest destiny of the United States was to settle western lands. This
settlement occurred by facilitating homesteading rights out of the
expansive “public domain.”205 As detailed above, U.S. public land policy
203. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: The Rehnquist Court’s Perpetuation
of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 358, 363–65
(1992) (arguing that even the modern application of U.S. law to Indian tribes is influenced by the
law’s racist roots); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219,
222 (1986) (arguing from a historical perspective that the Euro-centric legal system subjugates
American Indian culture and traditions).
204. See Tsosie, supra note 22, at 262–64 (discussing utilitarian framework that has governed
resources development in U.S.).
205. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 44
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was an outgrowth of the Doctrine of Discovery, which accorded
paramount title to the European sovereigns and their successors in
interest while relegating tribal property interests to the status of a right of
occupancy that the United States could extinguish by purchase or
conquest.206 The United States engaged in a treaty process with Native
peoples until Congress ended this practice in 1871.207 The United States
effectuated land cessions after that time by negotiating agreements with
Indian nations, which were then formalized by congressional statutes.208
However, the idea of consensual political bargain gave way to political
force after the Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock.209 In this opinion, the Supreme Court held that the United
States had the power to unilaterally abrogate an Indian treaty and open
tribal lands to non-Indian settlement, and the Court denied the tribal
claimants any relief, finding that this was a “political question” not
amenable to judicial review.210 The Supreme Court ultimately modified
this ruling in 1980, when it decided a case that raised a similar issue in
the context of a federal statute that appropriated land from the Lakota
Nation.211 In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,212 the Supreme
Court upheld congressional power to abrogate Indian treaties and to
control the disposition of tribal property in its role as trustee, so long as
it provided the Nations with “equivalent value.”213 However, the Court
held that Congress’s power as a trustee should not be conflated with its
power of eminent domain.214 Therefore, government “takings” of
federally protected tribal land for a “public use” were subject to payment
of “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment.215
The Lone Wolf decision is the judicial equivalent of many nineteenth
century federal policies that placed tribal governments under the
domination of the U.S. government. In 1830, Congress enacted

(3d ed. 1993).
206. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
207. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 25 (discussing The Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871,
ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006)), which provided that Indian
nations would no longer be treated as independent nations through treaties).
208. Id.
209. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
210. Id. at 568.
211. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 416.
214. Id. at 408.
215. Id. at 422.
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legislation authorizing the removal of many Indian nations from their
traditional lands and placing the tribes on small federal “reservations”
under the control of federal superintendents.216 The Dawes Allotment
Act of 1887217 went a step further, authorizing Congress to allot tribal
reservations to individual tribal members and then release the “surplus”
lands for non-Indian settlement.218 Like the Removal Act of 1830, the
Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 contemplated specific agreements with
each affected tribe.219 However, the 1903 Lone Wolf opinion disregarded
the need for tribal consent, authorizing Congress to unilaterally override
existing treaties to force the allotment of reservations and release
“surplus” lands.220 Not surprisingly, the combined effect of the Dawes
Act and the Supreme Court’s authorization of unilateral treaty
abrogation resulted in a staggering loss of two-thirds of the tribal land
base from 1887 to 1934, when Congress ended the allotment policy.221
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was the federal administrative
entity responsible for implementing the allotment policy.222 The BIA
started out in the Department of War and then was transferred to the
Interior Department in 1849.223 In the nineteenth century, the BIA
promulgated federal administrative regulations to “civilize” and
“Christianize” the Indian people.224 These orders disrupted every aspect
of tribal self-government, including the tribes’ ability to educate their
children or engage in traditional cultural practices, including religious
and healing practices.225 Although these policies would clearly violate
216. The Removal Act of 1830 generally authorized the removal of Indian tribes from their lands.
Because these removals were anticipated to be “consensual,” they were effectuated through treaties
with the specific tribes slated for removal and then codified in statutes that implemented the treaties.
See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830); Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.
217. Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 (2000)) (repealed 2000).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).
221. Tribal landholdings dropped from 138 million acres in 1887 to 24 million acres in 1934
when the Indian Reorganization Act formally ended the federal allotment policy. GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 30.
222. Dawes General Allotment Act ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
223. Alyce Adams, The Road Not Taken: How Tribes Choose Between Tribal and Indian Health
Service Management of Health Care Resources, 24 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 21, 22 (2000).
224. See, e.g., RULES FOR COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES (1892), reprinted in ROBERT T.
ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 103, 103–05 (2d ed. 2010);
see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 579.
225. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 101–02.
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the Bill of Rights if applied to American citizens, Indian people were
officially considered wards of the U.S. government and were not
admitted to citizenship status until 1924.226 This meant that the federal
policies banning Native religion or forcibly removing Indian children to
federal military-style boarding schools were permissible as secular
policies of “civilization” applied to “wards” of the federal
government.227 If applied to U.S. citizens, these laws would have been
held unconstitutional under the First Amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.228
2.

Twentieth Century Policies Governing Environmental Regulation
and Energy Development Emerge from Nineteenth Century
Federal Land Policy

In terms of environmental policy, the BIA administered tribal lands
through many of the same policies that pertained to federal public lands,
including leasing lands for mineral and timber exploitation at belowmarket rates.229 Unlike the treatment of federal public lands, however,
the tribal governments were the designated legal beneficiaries of these
lands,230 and tribal members actually resided on the lands that were
opened for timber harvesting and mineral exploitation.231 For many
years, tribal lands were treated as resource colonies for the benefit of the
United States.232 This policy was exploitive but entirely consistent with

226. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 conferred citizenship on all non-citizen American
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch.
233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)). Prior to this time,
some Indians were naturalized to U.S. citizenship by specific laws, such as those admitting veterans
of the U.S. armed services to citizenship and those allowing Indian women who married non-Indian
citizens to take the status of their husbands. However, most remained non-citizens until the
enactment of the 1924 statute.
227. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20.
228. The First Amendment protects individual rights to free speech, freedom of association, and
religious freedom. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that no one shall be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and contains procedural and
substantive protections.
229. Tsosie, supra note 22, at 300–01.
230. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 17.01, at 1074–75 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
231. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 205, at 55 (observing that trial trust lands are not “public
lands” because they must be managed on behalf of the Indian tribes and individuals as beneficiaries,
but also noting that tribal lands cannot be disassociated from public land policy because both are
administered under the authority of the Department of Interior (DOI) and DOI leasing and land
management policies are consistent in many respects).
232. Tsosie, supra note 22.
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the “wardship” status of Indian nations.233 The environmental and health
consequences of these policies, which lasted until the 1970s, devastated
many tribal communities.234
The best example of the ways in which national policies governing
energy development on public lands combined to impact the Native
peoples’ health and environment comes from the U.S. policies
promoting uranium production on federal and tribal lands in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.235 In the late nineteenth century, the
U.S. began uranium exploration and found rich deposits throughout the
Southwest.236 In 1939, the U.S. government began active exploration of
uranium on the Navajo reservation and began a classified survey of the
Colorado Plateau in 1942, including covert mining.237 After World War
II, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which
established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).238 AEC controlled
the uranium industry, and all uranium mined within the U.S. had to be
sold to the AEC.239 In the 1950s, the BIA approved leases of Navajo
land to select companies, authorizing them to mine uranium within the
Navajo Nation.240 The BIA instructed the tribal council that this was a
beneficial industry that would employ many Navajo workers.241
The U.S. Public Health Service conducted the first studies of uranium
mining on the Navajo Nation in 1949.242 Although scientists already
knew the health impacts of radioactive exposure, and precautionary
measures were available,243 these protections were not made available to
Navajo workers.244 Furthermore, the Navajo workers were not informed

233. Id.
234. Id. at 302–03.
235. See INDIANS AND ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTHWEST 15 (Sherry L. Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010) [hereinafter INDIANS AND ENERGY].
236. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 218 n.208 (citing Barbara Rose Johnston & Susan Dawson,
Resource Use and Abuse on Native American Land: Uranium Mining in the American Southwest, in
WHO PAYS THE PRICE: THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 142, 144
(Barbara Rose Johnston ed., 1994)).
237. Id.
238. Barbara Rose Johnston, Susan Dawson & Gary Madsen, Uranium Mining and Milling:
Navajo Experiences in the American Southwest, in INDIANS AND ENERGY, supra note 235, at 111,
115.
239. Id. at 117.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 116.
243. Id. at 118–20.
244. Id. at 120.
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about the hazards of their jobs, including the need to change clothing
before they returned home to their families.245 Navajo miners breathed
the air and drank the water contaminated by the radioactive ore.246 None
of this was disclosed to the Navajo Nation, and the U.S. government
continued to approve contracts with mining companies, touting uranium
production as tribal economic development and jobs creation.247
The health studies continued without the knowledge of the tribe or
tribal members.248 In 1952, another health study documented the high
mortality rate among uranium miners from lung cancer.249 Again, this
was not disclosed for fear that the Navajo workers would quit their jobs
if they knew.250 The AEC monitored the economics of uranium
exploitation for the benefit of the U.S. military, and it took the position
that it had no responsibility for worker health or safety.251
In 1971, federal law shifted to favor the use of nuclear energy by
commercial operators.252 Because commercial operators were now the
purchasers of uranium, the health impacts were of direct relevance to
laborers.253 Thus, the impacts of uranium mining on Native workers and
their families became the subject of multiple Congressional hearings.254
Congress ultimately enacted the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation
Act, which was amended in 2000.255 This Act provided limited
compensation to miners or to their widows if they met a stringent set of
requirements intended to document the direct causal relationship
between the mining practices and the death or disease that caused them
harm.256 The legislation only compensated individuals who could meet
the tort standard for liability.257 It thus did not compensate the Navajo
Nation for the harm and injury caused to its land and to many Navajo
245. Id.
246. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 219.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id. (noting that the mining companies would not provide employee lists until the United
States Public Health Service (USPHS) agreed that its doctors would not divulge the potential health
hazards to the workers, nor would they inform those who became ill that their illnesses were
radiation related).
251. Id. at 117.
252. Johnston, Dawson, & Madsen, supra note 238, at 111, 120.
253. Id. at 120.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 111–12.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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people, including the future generations who would suffer from
radioactive exposure.258
Federal policy shifted again in the latter part of the 1970s in the wake
of nuclear spills and public outcry.259 Federal policy began to both
minimize the role of nuclear power as an energy source and amplify the
role of coal, oil, and gas exploration.260 These industries have also
caused environmental impacts for the Navajo Nation and other energy
resource tribes,261 but they are often supported by tribal leaders as one of
the sole mechanisms for tribal economic development.262
This case study of energy development on the Navajo Nation
highlights the way in which the U.S. government used science policy to
enhance its capacity to mine uranium at the lowest price possible in
order to serve the “greater good,” namely, the “national security” interest
of the U.S. Although the harms to human health and to the environment
were well-documented by existing science, the U.S. government did not
disclose this to the Navajo Nation in a way that would enable that
government to protect its lands and members.
U.S. public health officials instead conducted a covert “medical
experiment” on the Navajo people, reminiscent of the infamous
Tuskegee Experiment,263 to document the effects of uranium exposure
on human beings.264 In addition, the U.S. government failed to take an
258. See id. at 112, 125–27 (discussing long term effects of uranium mining in the context of the
“Millworkers Study”).
259. See id. at 122 (discussing the impact of the 1979 United Nuclear Corporation dam failure
near Church Rock, New Mexico, among other mining-related crises).
260. Id.
261. Andrew Needham, “A Piece of the Action:” Navajo Nationalism, Energy Development, and
Metropolitan Inequality, in INDIANS AND ENERGY, supra note 235, at 111, 115.
262. For example, the Hopi Tribal government and the Navajo Nation endorse continued
production of coal on their respective reservations and the operation of the coal-fired power plants
that employ many tribal members, despite the pollution that naturally results from these industries,
because there are very few options for employment in this rural area of the Southwest.
263. In 1932, the USPHS commenced the Tuskegee Syphilis study to document the nature of
syphilis, including its progression in human beings. The subjects of the study were 399 black
sharecroppers in Alabama who had latent syphilis and 201 men without the disease, who constituted
the control group. The physicians who conducted the study did not inform the men about their
disease or provide treatment. They did provide meals, medical exams, and burial insurance to ensure
that the men did not seek treatment elsewhere. The study operated covertly until news sources
revealed the story in 1972. After significant national embarrassment, the federal government ended
the study and initiated policy changes to provide protection for human subjects of medical research.
Myrtle Adams et al., Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee—May 20,
1996,
UNIV.
of
VA.
CLAUDE
MOORE
HEALTH
SCI.
LIBR.,
http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/medical_history/bad_blood/report.cfm (last visited July 12,
2012).
264. See id. (discussing the radiation experiments funded by the U.S. government from 1944 to
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active role in remediating the harm after the uranium mining companies
pulled out of active operation, leaving huge piles of uranium tailings and
holding ponds of radioactive waste.265
In 1979, one of the mud dams that contained a holding pond near
Church Rock, New Mexico, burst, spilling 1100 tons of uranium tailings
and an estimated 100 million gallons of radioactive wastewater into the
Rio Puerco River.266 Experts have cited this spill as the largest nuclear
spill in U.S. history, and it caused extensive damage to local Navajo
families, including the loss of their livestock, which were poisoned by
drinking the radioactive water.267 The Navajo plaintiffs attempted to sue
United Nuclear Corporation in tribal court, but the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Navajo plaintiffs were preempted from doing so by the
Price-Anderson Act.268 The Price-Anderson Act is a federal statute that
limits the liability of any company engaged in nuclear energy production
for the harm or damage caused by its activity.269 It is a complicated
statute that creates a high burden for plaintiffs to prove causation and
establishes a cap on the damages they can receive upon meeting that
burden.270 Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court
must decide cases under this statute using the “neutral laws” and
“scientific evidence” promoted by federal policy.271 In short, the Navajo
Nation and its members are divested of any authority to redress the
harms they have suffered from uranium mining, other than the very
narrow set of claims that Congress has authorized.
This profound legacy of federally-authorized radioactive
contamination inspired the Navajo Nation to enact its own law, the Diné
Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005.272 This law, among other
things, prohibits all uranium mining within the Navajo Indian
Country.273 The Navajo Indian Country is defined to extend to lands
within the “checkerboard” area, an area in the state of New Mexico that
1974 to study the effects of radiation exposure on human populations, and noting that these studies
were typically conducted without the patient’s awareness or consent to participate). Uranium miners
were among the human subjects tested in the radiation experiments.
265. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 238, at 122.
266. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 220 (citing Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal
Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393 (2006)).
267. Id.
268. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1999).
269. Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h (2006).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 2210.
271. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 485–86.
272. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1303 (2005).
273. Id.
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is comprised of fee lands and tribally owned lands that is populated
virtually exclusively by Navajo people.274 The checkerboard area
exemplifies the mixed land titles within the exterior boundaries of many
Indian reservations caused by nineteenth century federal land grants to
the railroad companies intended to promote westward expansion. Today,
the checkerboard area claimed by the Navajo Nation is the focus of
jurisdictional disputes caused by private companies seeking permits to
drill for uranium on parcels of non-Indian owned fee land within the
area.275 In accordance with the jurisdictional rules of federal Indian law,
if the land in this area is “Indian Country,” then the EPA maintains
primary permitting authority in cooperation with the Navajo Nation.276 If
the land is not “Indian Country,” then the State of New Mexico may
authorize drilling for uranium on privately-owned or state-owned lands
in the area but not on any lands still held in “Indian title.”277
The jurisdictional issues are currently being litigated in the federal
courts.278 In Hydro Resources, Inc. v. EPA,279 the Tenth Circuit, sitting
en banc, held that a parcel of fee land owned by Hydro Resources, Inc.
within Section 8 of the checkerboard area was not a “dependent Indian
community” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).280 This holding
reversed the EPA’s land status determination and overruled an earlier
Tenth Circuit panel opinion in the same case holding that the area was a
“dependent Indian community” within the meaning of the federal statute
defining “Indian country.”281 Section 8 falls within the Church Rock
Chapter of the Navajo Nation, an area comprised of over seventy-five
percent trust land, both tribal and allotted, with a population that is
ninety-eight percent Navajo.282 These demographics supported the
274. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 254.
275. See generally HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding private company
was subject to federal permitting on fee land within Navajo Nation).
276. See, e.g., Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469–72 (9th Cir. 1985)
(explaining the intersection of federal Indian law with environmental law in the context of the
respective regulatory authority of the states, the EPA, and tribal governments); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian Country” for jurisdictional purposes).
277. Cf. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1472 (holding that the EPA appropriately refused to
allow the State of Washington to apply its hazardous waste regulations to Indian lands).
278. For an excellent analysis of the current litigation within its historical context, see Claire R.
Newman, Creating an Environmental No-Man’s Land: The Tenth Circuit’s Departure from
Environmental and Indian Law Protecting a Tribal Community’s Health and Environment, 1 WASH.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 352, 356–401 (2011).
279. 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
280. Id. at 1166.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1168–69 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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EPA’s finding that any permits to mine uranium in the area would
require the approval of the Navajo Nation and EPA.283 The Tenth
Circuit’s en banc opinion found, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government284
should be interpreted as negating the “community of reference” test,
which includes an analysis of population demographics.285 The circuit
court thus ruled that the parcel of land should be considered in isolation
from the remainder of the land within the Church Rock Chapter of the
Navajo Nation.286
The finding that non-Indian ownership of a parcel of fee land justifies
state jurisdiction obviously constrains the jurisdiction of the Navajo
Nation to protect its lands and members. In addition, the controlling
politics is based on the same utilitarian calculus that was responsible for
the initial harms of uranium mining on the Navajo Nation. In this case,
many policymakers now assert that nuclear energy is “green energy” and
uranium production should be expanded in order to minimize the
greenhouse gas emissions.287 Assuming that the argument is defensible,
the costs of uranium mining will fall disproportionately upon the people
who live on or near the lands that will be mined. Unlike state- or federalpublic lands, reservation lands are the home of many Native peoples.
Companies such as Hydro Resources, Inc. tout new methods of drilling
for uranium as “safe” technologies,288 but there is insufficient
information to substantiate this claim.289
Because the Navajo Nation possesses an estimated twenty-five
percent of the recoverable uranium in this country, the Nation will bear
the brunt of a national energy development policy that promotes uranium
mining.290 For example, in another recent Tenth Circuit decision, Morris
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,291 the court upheld the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision to grant Hydro Resources,
283. See id. at 1139.
284. 522 U.S. 520, 532–34 (1998).
285. See Hydro Res., 608 F.3d at 1135, 1141.
286. Id. at 1166.
Apr.
16,
2006,
287. See
Patrick
Moore,
Going
Nuclear,
WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401209.html
(portraying nuclear energy as the wave of the future and the dangers of uranium mining remedied).
288. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 224.
289. I think it is safe to say that we don’t “know” that this is a safe technology. There are no
studies on this in relation to human health, and we don’t want to resurrect the “radiation
experiments” of the 1950s.
290. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 218 n.206.
291. 598 F.3d 677 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Inc. a source-materials license for its uranium mining operation on
Section 17 within the Church Rock Chapter.292 In Section 17, the
existing radiation levels already exceed the maximum exposure limits,
and it is unclear whether groundwater contamination can be
remediated.293 The Navajo residents of the Church Rock Chapter rely
upon the groundwater to supply drinking water for themselves and their
livestock.294 Thus, the risk of harm posed by uranium mining within the
checkerboard area falls disproportionately upon the Navajo people,
while the primary jurisdictional authority resides with the state and
federal governments.
In short, national energy and environmental policies continue to
dominate the future of Indian nations and tribal lands under a Western
policy model that combines economics and science to determine what is
best for “American society.” What about the health impacts on tribal
members? Again, it is science that measures risk and tells us what is
“beneficial” and what is “harmful” as a matter of social policy. The
science of “risk assessment” is often based upon assumptions of how the
“average” U.S. citizen lives and works, rather than the lifestyles of
Native peoples who live on reservations and may consume fish on a
daily basis or drink water from wells adjacent to lands contaminated by
mining waste.295 With that reality in mind, this Article will now turn to
the issue of national health policy and its impact on indigenous peoples.
B.

U.S. Health Policy

U.S. public health policy and the policies that drive health research
and facilitate biotechnology rely heavily upon scientific data. In this area
of public policy, new scientific discoveries are seen as a social good and
are often rewarded by patents for new medicines and technologies.
Admittedly, there is not a direct linkage between the patenting of new
discoveries in the area of health technology and the nineteenth century
Discovery Doctrine that appropriated Native lands for public use.
However, as this section of the Article will demonstrate, U.S. health
policy, like U.S. public land policy, has significantly affected Native
peoples since the earliest days of this country’s history, and its use of

292. Id. at 684–705.
293. Id. at 684, 695.
294. Tsosie, supra note 2, at 224; see also Morris, 598 F.3d at 682.
295. Richard A. Du Bey & James M. Grijalva, Closing the Circle: Tribal Implementation of the
Superfund Program in the Reservation Environment, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 279, 288–
89 (1993–1994).
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science and economics similarly continues to affect tribal interests in
ways that are often invisible to the dominant society.
1.

U.S. Public Health Policy and Native Peoples

Because tribal governments enjoy a distinctive political status under
federal law, the Indian Health Service and its policies heavily govern
tribal access to health care.296 In this sense, U.S. health policy affects
Native peoples more than other Americans, just as U.S. public land
policy disproportionately impacts Native peoples. Today, U.S. health
policy also recognizes Native Americans as “minority populations” who
suffer from significant health disparities, as do many other minority
groups.297 The cause of these disparities is the topic of many articles and
theories, but it is clear that the nineteenth century federal policies, which
appropriated Native lands and resources for public use and forced tribes
to transition from their traditional land-based economies to dependency
upon federal commodities, provided the initial cause of the Native
people’s health care disparities.298 This connection between U.S. public
land policy and U.S. health policy would be invisible to most
Americans, but it continues to play an important role in the Native
peoples’ quality of life.
Today, the overwhelming poverty within many reservation
communities and the prevalence of alcohol and tobacco use exacerbates
the health disparities faced by tribal members.299 Reservation
communities tend to be rural and isolated, and therefore residents lack
access to the healthy foods and fitness facilities that suburban American
citizens enjoy.300 In addition, poor road conditions and marginal access
to hospitals and trauma facilities contribute to higher than average
mortality rates attributable to accidents and injuries on the
reservations.301
296. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2(a), 90 Stat. 1400, 1400
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)).
297. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT, 2009 180–233 (2010) [hereinafter
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT].
298. See Stephen J. Kunitz, The History and Politics of U.S. Health Care Policy for American
Indians and Alaskan Natives, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1464, 1465, 1473 (1996).
299. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH: INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE, PROMOTION,
AND POLICY (Everett R. Rhoades ed., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH].
300. Yvette Roubideaux, Beyond Red Lake — The Persistent Crisis in American Indian Health
Care, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 1881, 1882 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp058095.
301. See generally id.; Thomas Stewart, Philip May & Anita Muneta, A Navajo Health Consumer
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According to a 1988 Report of the Institute of Medicine, public health
policy reflects “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions in which people can be healthy.”302 Contemporary public
health policy is understood to include environmental health, disease and
injury control, involuntary testing for disease, contact tracing of disease,
immunizations and mandatory treatment, and quarantine policies for
persons with infectious diseases.303 The powers of the state and federal
governments to regulate public health are generally understood to derive
from their respective constitutional authorities304 and from the inherentpolice powers of state governments to regulate public health, safety, and
welfare.305
Tribal governments also possess police powers as an aspect of their
inherent sovereignty.306 However, their unique political status under
federal law results in a different legal framework for tribal health policy
and sometimes in disparate rights. For example, the decision of the U.S.
Public Health Service to covertly study the effects of radioactive
exposure on Navajo mine workers in the 1950s indicates that Native
American people have sometimes been treated as involuntary subjects of
U.S. public health research experiments.307 Of course, by the 1950s,
Indians were full citizens,308 demonstrating that even this status could
not insulate them from the harms of U.S. policy. Rather, the Navajo
uranium mining case evokes the past understanding of policymakers that
Native Nations were to be treated as “wards” and political subjects of the
U.S. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Native peoples were under the
jurisdiction of the Department of War, which administered their health
needs in the wake of disease epidemics, such as smallpox, measles, and
influenza, that decimated many Native villages.309 In fact, the very first
Survey, 18 MED. CARE 1183 (1980).
302. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1st ed. 1988).
303. See generally F. Douglas Scutchfield & C. William Keck, Concepts and Definitions of
Public Health Practice, in PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 3–9 (Stephen J. Williams
ed., 1997).
304. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(finding that state authority to require compulsory vaccination is acceptable under state police
power).
305. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
306. See generally COHEN, supra note 230, § 4.01, at 204–20.
307. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
308. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006).
309. Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native Americans:
Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 214 (1997).
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federal law governing Native health was an 1819 statute designed to
protect U.S. servicemen from contracting smallpox from Indians.310
When the BIA was transferred to the Department of Interior (DOI), the
DOI assumed the function of providing medical care to Indians for two
purposes: to control disease epidemics that could jeopardize American
citizens and to meet treaty obligations to provide physicians to tribal
governments.311
What about the sovereign right of tribal governments to regulate
public health? This function of tribal self-governance was overtly
repudiated by federal policymakers until the 1970s.312 In the latter part
of the nineteenth century, the BIA actually outlawed traditional
indigenous healing practices on the reservation, thereby forcing the
Western model of medicine upon tribal governments.313 The federal
government formalized the federal appropriation for Indian health care
in the 1921 Snyder Act,314 causing concern about the cost of this service
to federal taxpayers. In 1954, the Indian Health Service was transferred
to the Department of Health and Human Services as a branch of federal
public health policy.315 The transfer’s asserted purpose was to “improve
health services to Indian people, to avoid duplication of public health
services, and to further the long-range objective of integrating Indian
people into American common life.”316
It was not until the 1970s that federal policy formally recognized any
distinctive role for tribal governments. The Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975317 effectuated the new federal
policy of self-determination for tribal governments.318 This Act allowed
tribes to assume control over services that the federal government
previously provided and develop new services for tribal members.319 In
310. Lloyd B. Miller, The Contemporary Statutory Framework for Native Healthcare, Lecture at
the New Directions in Native Healthcare CLE Conference (Nov. 5, 2010).
311. See generally Kunitz, supra note 298, at 1464; AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH, supra note 299.
312. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 309, at 216 (describing enactment of Indian SelfDetermination and Education Act of 1975, which provided a mechanism to transfer administrative
authority to Tribes); see also Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United
States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1991).
313. See RULES FOR COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES (1892), supra note 224, at 103, 104.
314. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
315. Transfer Act of Aug. 5, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-568, 68 Stat. 674 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2004 (2006)).
316. Id. at § 102.
317. 25 U.S.C. § 450.
318. Id.
319. Id; see generally Adams, supra note 223.
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the 1990s, the federal “self-governance” policy enhanced the ability of
tribal governments to administer their own health care systems.320
However, many tribes lack the necessary financial resources to assume
direct control of their health care system.321 The Indian Health Service
continues to provide a basic level of health care to tribal members,
although the extent of this care is somewhat dependent upon
congressional funding cycles.322 Some tribal governments have
successfully harnessed the revenues from gaming to assist them in
delivering outstanding health care to tribal members within triballyoperated reservation clinics and hospitals.323
Despite these modern policy innovations, a 2009 study on national
health care disparities documents that American Indians and Alaska
Natives rank the lowest of any population with respect to the quality of
care they receive and the quality of their actual health outcomes.324
Given these disparities, one would hope that the advances in health care
that biotechnology makes possible would be utilized for the overall
improvement of Native health. In fact, however, the historical context of
exploitation and differential rights documented above continues to
impact the tribes’ ability to receive benefits from contemporary health
care innovations, including genomic research and personalized
medicine.
2.

Native Peoples and Health Care Innovation

Scientists and policymakers often tout the technological advances
represented by biotechnology as holding great public benefit,325 and yet
they also may represent a distinctive set of harms to indigenous peoples.
In fact, the issue of genetic research on indigenous peoples raises ethical
issues for several different scientific disciplines, including biomedical
research, physical anthropology, and bio-archeology.326 This became
apparent in 2004, when the Havasupai Tribe, indigenous to the Grand
Canyon in Northern Arizona, filed a lawsuit against Arizona State
University for its misuse of blood samples taken from tribal members
320. See Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat.
4250 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2006)).
321. See AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH, supra note 299, at 79.
322. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 309, at 215.
323. In Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community exemplifies this capacity, and the tribal
government has set a very high standard for health care on the reservation.
324. NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 297.
325. See Tsosie, supra note 2.
326. Id.
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pursuant to a diabetes study.327 While the Havasupai Tribe consented to
the diabetes study, it did not consent to the use of the samples for other
purposes.328 The Tribe filed this lawsuit after inadvertently learning that
the researchers had also used the samples for studies relating to
schizophrenia and human origins.329
Several Havasupai tribal members whose blood had been sampled in
the study also filed a claim, alleging lack of informed consent and
various tort harms, including emotional distress.330 Although the two
cases were later settled out of court, the Havasupai case study raises
important issues that continue to be unresolved, including whether a
cause of action exists to redress the various cultural harms that tribal
members expressed for the misuse of their blood samples, whether the
Tribe itself could be the holder of rights to tribal-genetic resources, and
how informed consent applies to groups as compared to individuals.
Population genomics is vitally important to the future of biomedical
research, as demonstrated by current innovations in bioengineering,
personalized medicine, and pharmacogenomics.331 Thus, the issue will
continue to be important in defining the trajectory of U.S. health policy.
However, population genomics also supports theories about human
origins that implicate the political status of indigenous peoples as the
“first peoples” of specific lands. In that sense, scientific researchers seek
to use physical samples from tribal members to prove the “truth” about
who the tribe really is and where it originated.332 The use of tribal
genetic material to prove the “truth” about its cultural identity is another
example of how science is used to foster a dominant cultural view—in
this case, about human habitation in the Americas.333 For the Havasupai
Tribe and other tribes whose physical samples have been used in similar
research, the scientific voyage of “discovery” continues unabated, only
this time the tour is through the alleged “genome commons” instead of
uncharted lands.334 In the process, indigenous understandings about their

327. Id. at 396.
328. Id.
329. Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1067
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
330. Id. at 1071.
331. See generally L.B. Jorde, W.S. Watkins & M.J. Bamshad, Population Genomics: A Bridge
from Evolutionary History to Genetic Medicine, 10 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 2199 (2001); J.R.
Stinchcombe & H.E. Hoekstra, Combining Population Genomics and Quantitative Genetics:
Finding the Genes Underlying Ecologically Important Traits, HEREDITY 158 (2008).
332. See Tsosie, supra note 2.
333. Id.
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identity continue to be disregarded as “cultural” or “religious” views,335
causing structural forms of epistemic injustice.
In the Havasupai case, for example, scientists claimed that
discovering the “truth” of human origins justified the use of indigenous
peoples’ blood and tissue to prove who they really were and where they
really came from.336 This case primarily concerned the legal issue of
who can “own” biomedical samples removed from living human
beings.337 However, the researchers’ argument in favor of using the
samples for other purposes also undergirds the effort of many physical
anthropologists and bio-archeologists to preserve “culturally
unidentifiable” Native American human remains for scientific use, rather
than “repatriating” them to contemporary indigenous peoples as
“ancestral” human remains. Thus, as the next section of this Article
demonstrates, genomic research ties directly into the nineteenth century
trope of “discovery” that was used to justify the collection of Native
American human remains for scientific study, again, in service of the
“greater good” for American society.
C.

Repatriation Policy

Unlike the U.S. public land and public health policies, federal
repatriation policy is quite specific to Native American people.338
Repatriation is intended to redress the harms of a traumatic past in which
Native human bodies and burial sites were desecrated with impunity by
citizens and government officials alike in complete disregard of Native
334. This is the language used to justify the Human Genome Project in which scientists competed
to “map” the human genome.
335. For example, the Havasupai Tribe considers its place of origin to be in the Grand Canyon,
while the scientific researchers are interested in proving the Tribe’s history of migrations from
another place to the Grand Canyon. The scientific claim is presented as a search for the “truth,”
while the Havasupai Tribe’s claim is represented as a “myth” substantiating the Tribe’s identity as
the Original People of the Grand Canyon, which is a form of epistemic injustice at the level of an
identity claim.
336. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 396.
337. In this sense, “ownership” stands for the right to use and control the disposition of human
tissue and biological samples. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–93 (Cal.
1990) (holding that an individual who agreed to give blood and tissue samples in the course of
treatment did not retain an interest in the samples sufficient to claim a share of the proceeds from a
cell line developed by University of California researchers and patented under federal law for
commercial use).
338. For example, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act specifies that it
“reflects the unique relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes and Native
Hawaiian organizations and should not be construed to establish a precedent with respect to any
other individual, organization or foreign government.” 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2006).
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human rights.339 The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) is significant because Congress
actually took responsibility for the historic injustice to Native peoples
caused by federal policies.340 The government’s nineteenth century
policies treated Native Americans as objects of scientific inquiry rather
than human beings entitled to bury their dead with dignity and possess
cultural property as a matter of right.341 However, these human rights
abuses also extended into American citizens’ everyday practices. Before
the enactment of NAGPRA, citizens commonly looted Native American
burials for the remains and objects, which were sold and transferred as
commodities on the antiquities market.342 Although the federal
government made sporadic attempts to regulate despoliation of federal
lands by imposing criminal sanctions on persons who excavated public
land without a permit, it did not attempt to regulate the commercial sale
of Native American remains and cultural objects until NAGPRA was
enacted in 1990.343
1.

Overview of NAGPRA

NAGPRA protects the rights of Native American people to four
categories of cultural items: Native American human remains, funerary
objects, objects of cultural patrimony, and sacred objects.344 While
“human remains” and “funerary objects” have their standard meanings,
what constitutes an “object of cultural patrimony” or a “sacred object” is
dependent upon tribal law, which governs the permissible possession,
use, or disposition of an object as “individual” or “tribal” property.345 In
this sense, the statute can be understood as an effort to deal with
epistemic injustice, promoting a tribal definition of protected cultural
items instead of insisting upon categories from Anglo-American law,
which would be unable to address the Native peoples’ social and cultural
339. See Rebecca Tsosie, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the
Problem of Culturally Unidentifiable Remains: The Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2012).
340. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013.
341. Id.
342. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39–43 (1992).
343. See Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2006); Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa–mm (2006) (regulating excavations on public lands on
the theory that the federal government owns the lands and also owns all objects or remains found on
or under those lands).
344. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3).
345. Tsosie, supra note 339, at 816.
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experience.
NAGPRA has three primary goals. First, the statute increases the
protections for Native American graves located on federal and tribal
lands, providing for Native control over cultural items excavated from
such lands after 1990.346 Second, the statute outlaws commercial
trafficking in Native American cultural items.347 And finally, the statute
requires all federal agencies and federally-funded museums to compile
inventories of the Native American human remains and funerary objects
in their possession, as well as summaries of all other cultural items.348
These documents are then sent to all federally recognized tribes, which
are eligible to make claims for repatriation of any of the covered items
that are “culturally affiliated” to the tribe.349
The statute has worked well for many tribes, enabling them to
repatriate culturally affiliated human remains and cultural items.350
However, the Ninth Circuit has narrowed the test of “cultural affiliation”
in relation to ancient human remains that cannot be scientifically linked
to a contemporary Native American group, for example, through genetic
testing.351 Federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management,
have used this narrow definition to deny Native groups the right to
repatriate “culturally unidentifiable” Native American human remains
that are in the custody of museums or agencies.352 This category includes
many boxes of Indian crania and other body parts that were housed in
museum collections without any data to attribute the body parts to a
particular individual or tribe.353 It also includes the remains of tribes that
were exterminated by military conduct or disease epidemics,354 as well
as remains of tribes that the federal government has not recognized
under the federal acknowledgment process, even if the identity of the

346. 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
347. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006).
348. 25 U.S.C. § 3003.
349. Id. § 3005.
350. See Cecily Harms, NAGPRA in Colorado: A Success Story, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 615
(2012) (“[O]ver 700 human remains and over 2,000 associated funerary objects [have been
repatriated].”); Jeffrey Kluger, The Legal Battle: Archeology: Who Should Own the Bones?, TIME,
Mar. 5, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1169901,00.html (“[T]o date,
about 30,000 human remains and half a million funerary objects have been returned to tribes.”).
351. See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 879–82 (9th Cir. 2004).
352. See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1216 (D. Nev. 2006).
353. See Tsosie, supra note 339, at 818.
354. Id.
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remains has a known cultural affiliation to that group.355 And, finally, it
includes ancient remains, which are “Native American” but allegedly too
old to affiliate to any contemporary federally-recognized tribal
government.356
2.

Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Injustice

Although NAGPRA specifically authorizes many categories of
evidence in order to determine cultural affiliation, including the use of
oral tradition, the standard for cultural affiliation was conflated with
scientific analysis of “genetic” identity in the 2004 Ninth Circuit
decision in Bonnichsen v. United States.357 That case involved a set of
human remains—designated by the Press as “Kennewick Man”—that
washed ashore on the Columbia River, which is under the jurisdiction of
the Army Corps of Engineers.358 Upon first analysis, the remains seemed
notable because they allegedly had a “Caucasian” appearance and yet
radiocarbon dating techniques estimated them to be between 8000 and
9000 years old.359 The five tribes that held aboriginal title claims to these
lands made a joint claim under NAGPRA for ownership of the
remains.360 The tribes alleged that the remains were their common
ancestor and asserted that all five tribes shared similar cultural origins
and understandings, despite their modern division into five separate
governments.361 A group of scientists, including Douglas Owsley at the
Smithsonian Museum, filed a challenge to this claim.362 The scientists
asserted that NAGPRA should not apply to this case and that instead the
court should consider the remains to be “federal property” for purposes
of the federal Archaeological Resources Protection Act, which would
make the remains available for scientific analysis and research on human
origins.363
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
358. See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and
Contemporary Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 587–89 (1999).
359. Id. at 587.
360. Id. at 588.
361. Id. at 601–03.
362. Id. at 589, 589 n.19.
363. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, NO BONE UNTURNED: INSIDE THE WORLD OF A TOP
FORENSIC SCIENTIST AND HIS WORK ON AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS CRIMES AND DISASTERS
(2004); DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE
FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY (2000).
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The Ninth Circuit overturned the finding of the Department of Interior
that the remains predated European contact and should be considered
“Native American,” as well as the Secretary’s decision to transfer the
remains to the Tribal claimants.364 The Tribal claimants had proven that
they were the only indigenous peoples documented to have aboriginal
title to these lands and had also produced evidence of their cultural
affiliation to the remains based on statutorily permitted categories
including oral history and traditional knowledge.365 However, the court
reasoned that without proof of “genetic” similarity between the modern
tribes and the set of remains, no “cultural” affiliation could exist to
prove common ancestry.366
Significantly, the court began its opinion by alluding to the set of
remains as an important “scientific discovery” in the modern era because
the Kennewick Man was an ancient human that predated “recorded
history” on these lands.367 As such, this ancient individual belongs to
“science,” which is the body of knowledge that can tell us the truth as a
matter of genetic identity about who Kennewick Man really was and cast
some light on the contentious issue of the “peopling of the Americas.” In
that sense, the Bonnichsen case represents an example of epistemic
injustice for the five claimant tribes in the Pacific Northwest that is quite
similar to that suffered by the Havasupai Tribe. In both cases, the courts
are reluctant to see or understand the harms suffered by the tribal
claimants, while they are all too ready to generate an understanding of
the law that will further scientific discovery. The testimony of the tribal
claimants is entirely disregarded as “mythology” and “religious
ideology,” while the scientific data represented by genetic testing is
understood to have the capacity to tell us the “truth” about human
origins and identity.
Furthermore, the Bonnichsen and Havasupai cases also intersect to
some extent with the theme of discovery, as represented by the Lewis
and Clark Expedition. Some archaeologists continue to dispute that
contemporary Native Americans are the “First Peoples” of the lands now
claimed by the United States.368 Today, bio-archaeologists seek to use
physical samples to prove the truth of their theories, requiring them to
gather DNA samples from the remains and from the current Native
364. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir. 2004).
365. Id. at 881.
366. Id. at 879.
367. Id. at 868.
368. See Tsosie, supra note 358, at 596 (detailing the theories presented in the Bonnichsen case
about the origins of human populations in the Americas).
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American people who claim to descend from these ancient
individuals.369 This indicates a continuation of the nineteenth century
policies that promoted the Lewis and Clark Expedition of “Discovery”
and divested Native peoples of much of their land and cultural identity.
In both the past and present, the scientific analysis of Native peoples is
used to support the goals of the dominant society. The only difference is
that the current process of scientific discovery relies on the biological
samples of the study population, rather than on the data that Lewis and
Clark gathered about the tribes’ “moral character” and capacity to be
friends or enemies of the United States.
3.

The Contemporary Policy Debate over Culturally Unidentifiable
Human Remains

The debate over who “owns” ancient human remains continues to
affect the policies of the United States Department of Interior (DOI),
which oversees the federal statutory process dictating the appropriate
treatment and disposition of the vast stores of Native American human
remains in the custody of federal agencies and federally-funded
museums.370 In 2010, the National Park Service (NPS) within the DOI
released a new rule providing for the respectful disposition of “culturally
unidentifiable” Native American human remains to indigenous
communities based on geographical and other non-genetic markers of
“cultural” affiliation.371 The DOI issued the final rule after many failed
prior attempts, and nearly twenty years after NAGPRA’s passage.
Although the vast majority of Native American human remains (over
118,000) are labeled “culturally unidentifiable,” some researchers have
vehemently opposed the 2010 Rule, arguing that repatriation of these
remains would foreclose human origins research that serves a broader
public benefit.372
Recently, a group of archaeologists filed a claim in a California state
superior court seeking to enjoin the University of California from
transferring sets of human remains estimated to be nearly 10,000 years
old to the La Posta Band of Mission Indians, which has claimed cultural
affiliation to the remains.373 The remains, designated as the “La Jolla
369. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 396 (documenting that the scientific analysis of Havasupai blood
samples was directed, in part, to human origins research).
370. Tsosie, supra note 339, at 821.
371. Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Native American Human Remains, 43 C.F.R.
§ 10.11 (2012).
372. See Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8.
373. See White v. Univ. of Cal., No. C12-01978RS, at 2, 5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (order
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Skeletons,” were excavated on University property near San Diego and
housed at the San Diego Archaeological Center on the University’s
behalf.374 The La Posta Band of Mission Indians is a federallyrecognized tribe and one of the twelve associated bands of Kumeyaay
Indians who are indigenous to the area and claim these remains as their
common ancestors.375 However, all twelve bands agree that La Posta is
the appropriate tribal claimant.376
The University of California transferred the case to federal district
court because the complaint directly implicated the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and specifically challenged the
federal regulation on culturally unidentifiable Native American remains
now codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10.11.377 Specifically, the claimant
scientists alleged that the University has a duty “to determine whether or
not NAGPRA and its accompanying regulations actually apply to the La
Jolla Skeletons before Respondents dispose of them to the
Kumeyaay.”378 They further argued that a “disposition without such a
formal determination would arbitrarily and illegally destroy the La Jolla
Skeletons’ incalculable scientific value to Petitioners, and to the public
at large, and would violate NAGPRA.”379
The California lawsuit reflects a growing sentiment among scientists
that the federal regulations on culturally unidentifiable Native American
human remains “allow tribes to claim even those remains whose
affiliation cannot be established scientifically, as long as they were
found on or near the tribes’ aboriginal lands,” thus privileging the
cultural interests of tribes at the expense of scientific knowledge.380
This position is reflected in a recent editorial in Scientific American,
which argues that the 2010 regulation privileges “faith over fact” and
urges the federal government to repeal or revise the regulation.381 In the
opinion of Scientific American’s Board of Editors, the La Jolla remains
are unique because of their age and “[t]he excellent preservation of the
granting Kumeyaay Cultural Repatriation Committee’s motion to dismiss and granting Regents of
the University of California’s motion to dismiss).
374. Id. at 1.
375. Id. at 1–2.
376. Id. at 16.
377. Id. at 5–6; see also 43 C.F.R. § 10.11 (2012).
378. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 13, White v. Univ. of Cal., No. 12625891 (Super. Ct. of
Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).
379. Id.
380. Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8.
381. Id.
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specimens,” and they “might contain DNA suitable for analysis” using
new techniques that could “yield crucial insights into where early
Americans came from.”382 In a statement that evokes the same
nineteenth century trope of “discovery” that justified European
colonization of “the New World,” the editors conclude that:
The colonization of the New World was a watershed in the
odyssey that carried Homo sapiens from its African birthplace to
the entire globe. The stories of the trailblazers who
accomplished that feat deserve to be told. Their remains are the
shared patrimony of all Americans and, indeed, all peoples
everywhere.383
Dr. Duane Champagne, a leading sociologist at the University of
California and member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe,
criticized the Scientific American editorial, claiming that it:
[S]hows little understanding of the forms and strength of
indigenous relations to ancestors and to the requirements of
maintaining the spiritual stewardship of the land. From all
appearances, Scientific American isn’t making much effort to
understand indigenous cultures’ interpretations of reality,
meaning, and life. Instead the publication gives credence to
scientific, professional, and nonspiritual understandings of the
value and meaning of human ancestors and sacred funerary
objects. As far as the editors are concerned, American Indian
perspectives are irrelevant. They’re even irresponsible because
they don’t protect human history and knowledge.384
Dr. Champagne further notes that at the heart of the dispute is the
Kumeyaay Tribes’ claim that they have lived in this area for over 12,000
years according to their own stories and understandings.385 The scientists
claim that this is pure “folklore” and that no physical evidence exists that
the modern Kumeyaay Tribe is culturally affiliated to these ancient
remains or that they have been in the area more than “a few thousand
years.”386
Champagne argues for a “more multicultural, government-togovernment” approach to repatriation that incorporates “both scientific
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Duane Champagne, A New Attack on Repatriation, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/04/09/a-new-attackon-repatriation-107181.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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and indigenous values.”387 He also argues that collaboration between
scientists and Indigenous peoples would result in much greater benefit
than the current approach, which balances the “interests” of science
against those of Native peoples.388 Under this balancing approach, the
“public interest” in obtaining the maximum amount of knowledge will
nearly always outweigh the cultural interests of a small group of Native
Americans.
The California case, like the Bonnichsen and Havasupai cases,
exemplifies the continuing occurrence of epistemic injustice for Native
peoples. In all three cases, the scientists argue that the larger social
interest in human origins research ought to outweigh any asserted
“cultural” harm expressed by indigenous groups. This argument
effectively reduces the indigenous peoples to the status of religious
zealots, who are free to “believe” anything that they desire pursuant to
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so long as they do not
make demands that would contravene an important public interest.
Building on Dr. Champagne’s call for a new approach that better
respects the unique interests and rights of Native peoples, the final
section of this Article argues that contemporary human rights constructs
can offer a more principled basis for adjudicating the disputes that
continue to evoke “epistemic injustice” for indigenous peoples.
IV.

SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

As demonstrated above, American science has had a profound impact
on the legal and political rights of indigenous peoples on this continent,
and it continues to have this effect. Presumably, however, most scientists
would agree that the ideal future is one that respects the basic human
rights of all peoples, including indigenous peoples. Science is a valuable
tool in crafting social policy, and it can be used to further Native selfdetermination or, alternately, to reinforce the unjust structures that have
operated to suppress indigenous self-determination. This section of the
Article will discuss U.S. policy in light of international human rights
norms in order to demonstrate those two different uses and encourage
more conscious choices in the future.
The Article first discusses the basic argument for applying
international human rights norms to the domestic legislative,
administrative, and judicial structures that determine Native rights. The
Article then indicates how application of human rights norms could alter
387. Id.
388. Id.
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public policy in the areas of environmental, health, and repatriation
policy, and could potentially promote a new model for science policy
that is more inclusive of indigenous peoples’ distinctive interests and
rights.
A.

The Argument for Integrating International Human Rights Norms
into Domestic Law

Under principles of U.S. federal Indian law, Native peoples are
recognized as separate sovereign governments, and they have the same
capacity and need as other governments to build their economic base,
protect the health of tribal members, and regulate their lands and
resources for the benefit of future generations.389 As separate
governments, federally-recognized tribes in the United States have
certain legal and political rights that are unique and vital to their ability
to govern their lands and members. For example, tribal governments
have the right to lease their lands for mineral exploitation or other
energy development,390 to regulate air and water quality,391 and to
participate in regional adaptation plans designed to manage land and
water resources that transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of local or
state governments.392 They may also regulate the conduct of non-Indians
who enter their lands to engage in activities, including research, that
have the potential to impact the tribe or its members.393
In their capacity as sovereigns, tribal governments have the capacity
to enter partnerships with scientists for mutual benefit.394 Furthermore,
these agreements can, for the most part, be regulated by principles of
contract, tort, and property law, subject to the jurisdictional rules of
federal Indian law.395 However, as the Havasupai case demonstrates, the
389. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20.
390. COHEN, supra note 230, § 17.01, at 1074–75.
391. Id., §§ 10.01–.03, at 774–95.
392. Id.
393. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“A tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.”).
394. For example, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community has entered a partnership
agreement with T-Gen Corporation. See Collaborations with Genetics Researchers, AM. INDIAN &
ALASKA
NATIVE
GENETICS
RESOURCE
CENTER,
http://genetics.ncai.org/casestudy/collaborations.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
395. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (confirming tribal power to regulate the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, for example, through
a contract or lease agreement).
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capacity of tribal governments to enter consensual agreements with
researchers cannot solve the structural forms of epistemic injustice that
exist within our national policies. In this area, indigenous peoples’
human rights under international law become quite important. In
addition, human rights principles are vital to understanding indigenous
rights in cases where tribal governments no longer possess jurisdiction
over lands or other resources based on prevailing notions of property
law.
The domestic framework of federal Indian law actually supports
incorporation of human rights norms. The status of Native Nations as
separate peoples predates the political existence of the United States, and
a host of Supreme Court cases from the nineteenth century until the
present day have recognized this.396 The status of being a separate
people has both a political and a cultural component. The political
component is now understood to comprise the jurisdictional authority of
tribes as sovereign governments.397 However, Native peoples also
continue to exist as distinctive cultural groups within a dominant society
committed to “multiculturalism” and pluralism in a secular democracy.
As distinctive cultural groups, Native peoples often have divergent
interests from the dominant society which may find expression in their
need to protect sacred sites on lands no longer within their jurisdiction,
speak their languages, preserve their access to traditional food sources
and medicines, repatriate sacred objects, and prevent the
misappropriation of their ceremonies, songs, and other resources.398 All
of these interests are vital to the preservation of Native American
cultural integrity and are therefore pivotal to tribal self-determination.399
Consequently, Native American human rights should be factored into
U.S. public policy.
Of course, it is possible that the primary obstacle to reforming
domestic law to accord with human rights norms is America’s collective
blindspot when it comes to questions of “injustice.” American courts
generally fail to see the limitations of domestic law as a form of
396. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
10 (1831).
397. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking The Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191
(2001).
398. See generally COHEN, supra note 230.
399. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 131–41 (2d ed. 2004)
(explaining that cultural integrity is a key norm encompassed within the concept of selfdetermination).
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“injustice,” claiming instead that the Native claimants in Bonnichsen
failed to “meet their burden of proof” to show cultural affiliation, or
claiming that American property law simply cannot encompass a notion
of “group” ownership of tribal genetic material.400 Similarly, the courts
find that American tort law simply cannot extend to cover the cultural
harm that inappropriate use of a blood or tissue samples causes, or that
privacy law cannot extend to the public disclosure of photos of ancestral
remains.401 How do we navigate these controversies? More specifically,
how do we even approach the resolution of these debates, as a matter of
law or of ethics? International human rights law provides some insights
into these difficult questions.
B.

International Human Rights Law as a Tool of Public Policy

International human rights law provides a relevant set of norms to
address shortcomings in domestic legal frameworks. Of course, this can
only occur if our domestic courts and legislatures are willing to apply
those norms. Some state legislatures have attempted to ban the use of
international doctrines by their judicial systems.402 Even without such
drastic action, however, domestic courts have generally declined to
apply human rights norms, instead holding to the view that rights, if any,
must be embedded in domestic constitutional law, common law, or
statutory law.403 This is not true in many other countries, such as Canada
and Australia, where the domestic courts have readily applied human
rights norms to extend or recognize specific rights.404
While American courts tend to assume that the dominant society’s
appraisal of legal rights is the only relevant social experience,
international human rights law is in the process of documenting another
category of social experience: that of indigenous peoples throughout the
400. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2004).
401. See Tsosie, supra note 1, at 405–07.
402. On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a proposed constitutional amendment that
would prevent Oklahoma state courts from considering or using Sharia law. Awad v. Ziriax, 670
F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2012). After a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to
prevent the Oklahoma State Election Board from certifying this election result, and thereby making
the amendment effective, the Board sought review, but the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of
discretion by the lower court and affirmed the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1116–17.
403. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D.1982) (failing to find any authority
for the proposition that a right or cause of action is created by international human rights law).
404. See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.). In this case, the High
Court of Australia held for the first time that the indigenous peoples of Australia possessed
aboriginal land rights and that the earlier nineteenth century doctrines that failed to recognize these
rights violated human rights law.
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world. This work, which has been ongoing for several decades, validates
the fact that indigenous peoples throughout the world share a common
set of cultural and political attributes in relation to the dominant societies
that now encompass them.
Ideally, nation-states will consult this record of human rights law as
they work to retool their domestic legal systems to minimize structural
injustice. That is the message of James Anaya, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, who recently held a
series of consultations with tribal leaders and advocates in the United
States to document instances of injustice and prepare a “country report”
for the United States indicating whether the country is in compliance
with human rights norms and where the country should focus its efforts
to remediate existing injustice.405 This consultation follows from the
historic consensus of global nation-states that emerged in the context of
developing the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.406
In 2007, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which recognizes that indigenous peoples
possess the right to self-determination as a matter of international
policy.407 The right to self-determination secures the basic right of
indigenous peoples to autonomous self-governance within the nationstates that now encompass them.408 The Declaration envisions that the
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination will be exercised within
the nation-state’s basic structure, and the document advocates
consultation between indigenous peoples and the nation-states on
policies that will impact them.409 Specifically, the Declaration requires
states to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous
peoples concerned” and “to obtain their free, prior and informed
consent” before undertaking administrative or legislative actions that
will affect them.410
The Declaration’s many provisions attest to the unique interests of
indigenous peoples, which are often cultural, spiritual, and religious in
405. S. James Anaya is also a Professor of Law at the University of Arizona and widely
acclaimed scholar of international human rights law and indigenous rights. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra
note 399.
406. S. James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009).
407. Declaration, supra note 3.
408. See id. arts. 3–4.
409. See id. arts. 3–4, 19; Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can SelfDetermination Be Actualized Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
923, 930–35 (2011).
410. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 19.
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nature.411 It is precisely because of these unique interests that indigenous
peoples merit special consideration within domestic policymaking. As
demonstrated above, domestic policymaking is dependent upon a model
of secular pluralism. Secular pluralism privileges science, economics,
and technology as appropriate constructs for domestic public policy,
whereas “cultural” concerns are generally conflated with “religion” and
marginalized as matters of private conscience rather than public policy.
Human rights norms offer a more inclusive account of the multiple and
diverse interests that ought to be considered by policymakers in the
furtherance of indigenous self-determination.
It is significant that the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples after over twenty-five
years of negotiations, hearings, and intensive dialogues between
representatives of the nation-states and indigenous peoples.412 The
consultative process that led to the adoption of the U.N. Declaration
represented an effort to include indigenous peoples in the formation of
the norms that will govern them. Although the Declaration is purely
prescriptive at this point, it may eventually result in the adoption of an
international convention.413 Even without this action, however, the
Declaration has served a useful purpose, promoting a dialogue about
indigenous rights within the United States and many other global
nations.414
The United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada originally
dissented from adopting the Declaration because the document
recognized indigenous peoples as “peoples” with the same right to selfdetermination as other peoples.415 The United States and other countries
feared that this would foster claims by indigenous peoples to secede
from the nation-states.416 Importantly, however, the Declaration
expressly provides that nothing in its text justifies the impairment of
national boundaries,417 thereby indicating that the remedy of secession is
not available under international law for indigenous peoples, although it

411. Tsosie, supra note 409, at 927.
412. E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1982/82 (May 7, 1982).
413. Tsosie, supra note 409, at 925.
414. Id. at 928.
415. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 18–19, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13,
2007).
416. Christopher J. Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts: Egalitarian Juridical Pluralism, SelfDetermination, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1341, 1346 (2008).
417. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 46.
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might be available for other peoples when the right to self-determination
is suppressed under conditions of extreme injustice. President Barack
Obama formally announced his support for the Declaration in 2010, and
the U.S. State Department subsequently issued a position paper alleging
that the rights of federally-recognized tribes under federal Indian law
reflect the premise of the Declaration by favoring a policy of selfdetermination.418
It is clear that indigenous self-determination is the key norm to be
effectuated within U.S. policy. The norm of indigenous selfdetermination, in turn, prescribes recognition of indigenous rights of
autonomy, cultural integrity, and protection of lands and resources. The
Declaration envisions a relationship between indigenous peoples and
nation-states that operates as a consensual partnership. Thus, indigenous
peoples must agree to the terms of their relationship with the nationstates.419 Their right to autonomy may be secured through a selfgovernance model, such as that which applies to federally-recognized
tribal governments in the U.S. With respect to shared resources, Native
autonomy may also express through models of shared governance, such
as self-administration of federal programs and co-management of shared
resources. Finally, Native autonomy is served by a model of
participatory governance, which supports the efforts of tribal
governments to ensure that their members enjoy equal access to
important civil liberties, such as voting rights.420
The Declaration calls for a standard of “free, prior and informed
consent” before national governments take actions that would impair
Native rights.421 This standard is intended to ensure that the negotiations
between indigenous peoples and national governments are premised on a
foundation of respect, rather than coercion.422 In addition, the
Declaration alludes to important concepts, such as spiritual rights, that
are unique to indigenous peoples and should inform the policy dialogue
418. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec.
16, 2010), in 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1076, at 1–5; Announcement of U.S. Support for the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE 1–2 (Jan. 12,
2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/154782.pdf [hereinafter Announcement of U.S.
Support].
419. Announcement of U.S. Support, supra note 418.
420. See Tsosie, supra note 409, at 933.
421. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 19.
422. See id. (“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may
affect them.”).
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about their rights to land, natural resources, and cultural resources.423
Finally, the document maintains a commitment to reparative justice,
directing national governments to acknowledge the historical wrongs
that continue to disadvantage indigenous peoples from the enjoyment of
their human and civil rights, and requiring the governments to remediate
those inequities.424 In all of these respects, international human rights
law offers an alternative set of norms that can address the epistemic
forms of injustice that indigenous peoples continue to suffer in this
country.
C.

Human Rights Law and the Public Policy Arena: Envisioning a
Different Future

The discussion of injustice and human rights can seem theoretical and
abstract, so it is useful to examine specific human rights norms that
might inform U.S. public policy in the areas of the U.S. national
environmental, health, and repatriation policies.
1.

National Environmental Policy and Indigenous Rights

The Declaration offers a great deal of guidance for domestic
policymakers with respect to environmental and land management
issues. Most importantly, the Declaration specifically recognizes that the
essence of indigenous identity is represented in the group’s longstanding
connection to a particular land base and territory.425 Thus, harms to the
land can also constitute harms to indigenous identity. In addition, the
document recognizes that the relationship of the indigenous people to
their traditional lands is often a core feature of their cultural survival and
that the land may be fundamentally important to the continuance of
specific cultural and religious practices.426 Consequently, under the
declaration, the U.S. government would not only have to ensure the
423. “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters
and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this
regard.” Id. art. 25.
424. See id. Preamble (expressing concern over historic injustices that have been suffered by
indigenous peoples and calling upon nation-states to acknowledge their inherent rights and respect
their rights under treaties and political accords).
425. Id. (“Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over development affecting them and
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions,
cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and
needs.”).
426. Id.
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tribal government’s ability to regulate its reservation land base to
promote the health and cultural needs of its members, but it would also
have to ensure that its decisionmaking on public lands does not
jeopardize Native American cultural practices, for example, those
associated with sacred sites, such as the San Francisco Peaks.
The Declaration contains many provisions relevant to indigenous land
rights, but four seem particularly relevant to the discussion above. First,
the Declaration provides that “indigenous peoples have the right to
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship” with their
traditionally owned lands and waters and to “uphold their
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”427 The document’s
recognition of “spiritual rights” specifically incorporates indigenous
understandings of the universe and the metaphysics that governs human
interactions with the natural world.428 Second, the Declaration
emphasizes that indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands and territories
merit legal protection by the domestic government.429 This suggests that
the pervasive tendency of the United States to generate prescriptive
statements of law that are non-enforceable, such as the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, would not constitute effective legal protection
of indigenous rights under the Declaration. Third, Article 27 of the
Declaration requires states to establish and implement fair and
transparent processes to adjudicate indigenous land rights.430 Finally,
Article 28 provides that indigenous peoples should have the right to
“redress” for takings of their lands and resources that take place without
their “free, prior and informed consent.”431
Land use management is intimately tied to environmental and energy
policy, so the rights described above form the basis for many other
specific rights recognized by the Declaration. For example, Article 29
specifies that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the conservation
and protection of the environment,” as well as the right to enjoy the
“productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.”432 States
are counseled to take appropriate measures to guard against
environmental degradation that might be caused, for example, by storing
or disposing of hazardous materials on indigenous lands “without their

427. Id. art. 25.
428. See id.
429. Id. art. 26.
430. Id. art. 27.
431. Id. art. 28.
432. Id. art. 29.
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free, prior and informed consent.”433 In the U.S. this provision would
apply to any national policies that promoted forms of economic
development that are hazardous to the environment and to human health,
such as uranium mining on the reservation or storage of nuclear waste or
hazardous waste on tribal lands.
Article 20 of the Declaration provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples have
the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social
systems or institutions,” and that they should be “secure in the
enjoyment” of their own traditional economies.434 This provision
specifically recognizes that indigenous peoples are likely to have landbased subsistence economies that are vulnerable to destruction by
national government policies, such as off-shore oil drilling. Article 20
specifically provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples deprived of their means
of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.”435
In the years ahead, this provision is likely to receive significant
attention, given the politics of energy development. Off-shore oil drilling
is often understood as a means to ensure American energy
“independence.” The costs of this development, of course, are localized
on indigenous communities that practice subsistence ways of life.
2.

National Health Policy and Indigenous Rights

With respect to health policy, the Declaration provides at a general
level that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a
collective or as individuals” of all human rights guaranteed under
international law.436 Thus, to the extent that there is a recognized human
right to health, indigenous peoples are entitled to enjoy that right, in
common with all other citizens. They also have the right to be free from
discrimination in the exercise of that right.437 Article 24 specifically
provides that “Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional
medicines and to maintain their health practices,” as well as “the right to

433. Id.
434. Id. art. 20.
435. Id.
436. Id. art. 1.
437. Although there are international documents recognizing a human right to health, the United
States continues to deny that the government has any obligation to ensure realization of this right.
Thus, national health care is primarily conceived of as an economic system to improve the delivery
of health care and protect consumers against wrongful conduct by insurance companies or
employers. See also id. art. 2 (providing that indigenous peoples and individuals are “free and equal
to all other peoples and individuals” for purposes of exercising their rights and being free from
discrimination in the exercise of those rights).
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access, without any discrimination, all social and health services.”438 In
addition, “[i]ndigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” and
states are required to take the steps necessary to ensure “full realization
of this right.”439 This provision would counsel the United States to
engage in a consultative process with tribal communities about how to
address health disparities and reconfigure existing programs more fairly.
This would also enable Native peoples within the Indian Health Care
Service system to take advantage of the advances in health care
technology that are available to more affluent American citizens.
Currently, federal funding constraints applicable to the Indian Health
Service tend to limit the availability of costly forms of diagnosis and
treatment for many serious diseases, such as cancer. Moreover,
individuals who become sick during the latter part of the fiscal year may
be denied services altogether because the available funds have already
been exhausted.
The Declaration discusses genetic resources as a category of cultural
heritage, providing that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain,
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage,” and the
“manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including
human and genetic resources.”440 States “shall take effective measures to
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.”441 These provisions
would counsel the United States to adopt effective protections to ensure
that tribal genetic resources are not lumped into the “genome commons”
that will provide the raw material for future scientific innovations in
health care, such as personalized medicine. Existing research standards,
for example, those applicable to Genome Wide Association Studies,
draw on multiple sources and permit inclusion of all samples that are
“deidentified” from the actual donor in order to meet privacy
concerns.442 This restriction is not sufficient to address the tribal interests
identified in the Havasupai litigation and analogous international
cases.443
438. Id. art. 24.
439. Id.
440. Id. art. 31.
441. Id.
442. See, e.g., Genome-Wide Association Studies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS,
http://gwas.nih.gov (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
443. See Donald J. Willison, Trends in Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Information in
Contemporary Health Research: Challenges for Research Governance, 13 HEALTH L. REV. 107,
110 (2005) (detailing the misuse of blood samples taken from members of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth
First Nation of British Columbia, Canada).
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Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Repatriation Policy

The Declaration discusses the right of indigenous peoples to repatriate
their ancestral human remains in Articles 11 and 12. Article 11
recognizes that indigenous peoples have a “right to maintain, protect and
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures,”
including “archaeological and historical sites.”444 States must provide
effective redress, including restitution, for any “cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property” taken from indigenous peoples “without
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws,
traditions and customs.”445 This provision would suggest that the effort
of archaeologists to claim ownership of Native American burials,
including ancestral remains and funerary objects, is completely
antithetical to indigenous peoples’ human rights. In fact, the 2010
regulation on disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains that
scientists attack as “too favorable” to Native cultural interests, does not
provide for the mandatory return of funerary objects associated with the
human remains.446 Whether or not this omission violates NAGPRA, it
clearly constitutes a violation of international human rights law.
Article 12 specifically provides that indigenous peoples have “the
right to the repatriation of their human remains” and requires States to
enable access to and repatriation of any ancestral human remains and
ceremonial objects within their possession “through fair, transparent and
effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned.”447 The upshot of these provisions is to place the ownership
and control of indigenous human remains, funerary objects, and
ceremonial objects with Indigenous peoples. There is nothing within
international human rights law that supports the notion currently alleged
by many scientists that indigenous human remains are the “shared
patrimony of all Americans” or of “all peoples elsewhere.”448 The
United States has an obligation to ensure that indigenous peoples’
human rights are realized within its domestic legal system, and the
Declaration provides an appropriate normative basis to achieve its vision
of a consultative process of policymaking.
Human rights standards and principles can serve an important
function in reformulating public policy. To the extent that public policy
444. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 11.
445. Id.
446. 43 C.F.R. § 10.11 (2012).
447. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 12.
448. Who Owns the Past?, supra note 8.
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incorporates science policy, human rights standards can contribute to
developing an equitable legal framework that can represent the
experience of indigenous peoples in defining the benefits and harms of
our public policies.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored how science policy impacts indigenous
peoples, and it has advocated a shift from treating indigenous peoples as
objects of “scientific discovery” to working respectfully with indigenous
governments as equal participants in the creation of public policy. While
many people acknowledge the overt racism and cultural superiority of
nineteenth century science policy, few understand that those nineteenth
century themes continue to impact indigenous rights within the United
States in areas such as environmental policy, health policy, and
repatriation policy. These areas of public policy have had tremendous
impact on Native peoples in the United States, demonstrating the
pervasive “epistemic injustice” caused by the uncritical application of
Western values, categories, and standards to the very different social
experience of Native peoples.
American society has harmed indigenous peoples within domestic
social, political, and legal structures both in their capacity as “givers of
knowledge” and in their capacity as “subjects of social understanding.”
By incorporating human rights standards and honoring indigenous selfdetermination as both a legal right and a moral consideration, domestic
public policy can more equitably respond to indigenous peoples’
distinctive experience. Similarly, scientists and scientific organizations
can incorporate human rights standards into their disciplinary methods
and professional codes of ethics in order to explore the ethical and legal
implications of their work on indigenous peoples.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
calls for nation-states to engage indigenous peoples in a set of processes
designed to effectuate a more just framework for the realization of basic
rights and fundamental freedoms. This international human rights
framework supports the ability of indigenous peoples to claim their
sovereign right to live according to their own norms and values within
the nation-states that now encompass them, and to fully participate
within the domestic structures that determine whether “justice” will truly
be for all.

